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PRESERVATION LAW 1976-1980: FACTION, PROPERTY
RIGHTS, AND IDEOLOGY
JAMES P. BECKWITH, JR.*
Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed
Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its ten-
dency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popu-
lar governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their
character and fate as when he contemplates their propensity to this
dangerous vice.
James Madison
The Federalist, No. 10
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1975 the dramatic upsurge of interest in historic preservation
has continued apace.' The causes are many, but powerful incentives
for preservation certainly stem from the celebration of the Bicentennial
in 1976 as well as from the escalating transportation and building costs,
fueled primarily by inflationary domestic monetary policy. As is usu-
ally the case, over time both common law and legislation come to re-
flect the values and interests of society, albeit in dramatically different
ways.- So it is with historic preservation law. Reflecting mainly the
legislative dynamics of political economy, preservation law now covers
a wide spectrum of interests and exerts a significant influence over the
allocation of property rights in many jurisdictions.'
* Assistant Professor of Law, North Carolina Central University; B.A., University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D., University of Chicago. Part of the research for this paper was
completed under contract for the National Trust for Historic Preservation. The views expressed
herein, however, are not those of the National Trust. Much of the historical analysis was en-
hanced by the 1979 Liberty Fund Seminar in Modem Economic History held in Belmont, Califor-
nia.
1. For a discussion of state preservation law as of 1975, see Beckwith, Developments in the
Law of Historic Preservation and a Reflection on Liberty, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 93 (1976).
2. The contrast between common law and legislation has long been recognized in the work
of such scholars as Friedrick Hayek. See, e.g., F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960)
and F. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY (1975-77). In recent years, however, scholars
have shown great interest in theories of the efficiency of common law as opposed to legislation.
See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 399-418 (2d ed. 1977); Priest, The Common Law
Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUDIES 65 (1977); Rubin, Wy is the
Common Law Efficient? 6 J. LEGAL STUDIES 51 (1977).
3. For a summary of the more intrusive state statutes, see J. BECKWITH, SIGNIFICANT STATE
HISTORIC PRESERVATION STATUTES (1979).
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Although local, state, and federal preservation law has grown rapidly
during the past four years,' the single most important event was, of
course, the Supreme Court's holding in Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. City of New York' that a New York City landmark ordinance6 en-
acted pursuant to a state statute7 did not amount to a taking of property
for which compensation must be paid. Decided during a time of ex-
panded private-law preservation accomplishments,8 of a general recog-
nition of the inefficiency and incompetence of governmental
regulation,9 and of the influence and attitudes of the new class, Penn
Central is not without its ironies. Indeed, the Supreme Court's sanc-
tion of the expanded politicization of property rights typifies preserva-
tion law during the period and graphically illustrates a fundamental
choice facing the preservation movement, indeed all of American soci-
ety. Simply put, the choice is between the open society and faction,
between spontaneity and politicization. On the one hand is the Madi-
sonian model of civility, restraint, and the private law; on the other is
the grim reality of coercion, incivility, and the unprincipled redistribu-
tion of wealth so characteristic of present-day governance. Many
preservationists and their associates in various environmental coali-
tions exhibit all of the unhappy characteristics of Madisonian faction
and the new class, advocating as they do the supplanting of private
agreement by the public law. Ironically, all of this is done in the name
of preserving reminders of a past whose moral and economic founda-
tions in our own time are so badly eroded.
In light of these developments, this article has a dual purpose. First,
the article discusses the evolution of state and local preservation law
since 1975. The coverage is comprehensive and includes an appendix
that is an updated revision of my compilation of legislation first pub-
lished in 1976 by the National Trust for Historic Preservation in A
Guide to State Programs.
4. For discussions of preservation law prior to 1976, see symposia at 12 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1 (1976); 8 CONN. L. REV. 201 (1976); 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 309 (1971).
5. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
6. N.Y. CITY CHARTER & ADMIN. CODE, ch. 8-A, § 205.10 (1976).
7. N.Y. GEN. MUNIc. LAW § 96-a (McKinney 1977).
8. For a discussion of commercial revitalization and adaptive re-use in urban areas, see
Ziegler, Large-Scale Commercial Adaptive Use." Preservation Revitalizes Old Buildings - And New
Ones Too!, II N.C. CENT. L.J. 234 (1980). For a discussion of the operation of revolving funds,
see A. ZIEGLER, L. ADLER, & W. KIDNEY, REVOLVING FUNDS FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION: A
MANUAL OF PRACTICE (1975); Howard, Revolving Funds. In the Vanguard of the Preservation
Movement, II N.C. CENT. L.J. 256 (1980).
9. The literature is so vast that only a few representative samples need be given. See, e.g.,
M. ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER (1964); E. BANFIELD, THE UNHEAVENLY CITY REVIS-
ITED (1974); THE CRISIS OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (P. MacAvoy ed., 1970); R. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977); B. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING (1972);
Williams, Legal Restrictions on Black Progress, 21 How. L.J. 47 (1978).
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The article has, however, a second and more compelling purpose. As
a matter of social policy, the historic preservation movement is deeply
in error regarding legal methodology and first principles. Most
preservationists, especially those who are beneficiaries of public mon-
ies, advocate statist solutions to private problems. They prefer zoning,
with its public intrusion into matters of aesthetics, over private agree-
ment. They advocate increased public funding. Why do preservation-
ists prefer public solutions? Do many preservationists, especially the
intellectuals, advance their own self interest in governmental solutions
as members of the new class? Does the historic preservation move-
ment, with its roots in the humanities, share a historic bias against free-
market capitalism and a free society? One must ask whether the state
has any role to play in historic preservation beyond the enforcement of
contracts and the protection of private property. If not, how can the
influence of statist preservationists be overcome and the role of the
state in preservation matters be reduced to its proper minimal level? In
short, what is the preservation policy of a free society?
II. PUBLIC LAW: HISTORIC PRESERVATION AND THE POLICE POWER
If recent developments are any indication, then for the foreseeable
future the greatest changes in preservation law will occur within the
ambit of the police power to create historic districts and to designate
historic landmarks. Because most of the new preservation law is statu-
tory, it exhibits quite naturally the familiar characteristics of legislation
as opposed to other forms of law, such as common law and private
contracts. Briefly stated, legislation is inextricably wedded to the politi-
cal process and generally reflects no presumption save that of the effi-
cacy of whatever constituency secured its passage.' ° The recent
dramatic increase in public interest in preservation and in the scope
and quantity of preservation law is consistent with this model.
A. Historic District and Landmark Legislation
At present at least forty jurisdictions authorize some form of historic
district zoning,"' the most frequently used public-law regulation tech-
nique. Unlike landmark designation of a single building, the focus of a
historic district designation is on preserving the cumulative historical or
architectural quality of an interrelated group of buildings. Like zoning
controls, whose geographic and regulatory features may differ greatly
in complexity from place to place, historic district statutes also vary
10. R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 404-07.
I 1. See statutory appendix infra.
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widely. Since 197512 Alaska,13 the District of Columbia, 4 Indiana, 5
Iowa,' 6 Mississippi, 7 and Nebraska 8 passed new historic district stat-
utes; Alabama authorized "preservation districts" in Mobile;' 9 North
Carolina extensively revised its statute;2" and Rhode Island expanded
existing provisions to include East Greenwich, Coventry, and Woon-
socket.2
The Alaska, Mississippi, and Nebraka statutes are relatively modest,
and simply authorize the creation of historic districts without specify-
ing in detail the procedures to be followed.22 The Alaska statute, how-
ever, does give some guidance as to historic criteria that would justify
creating a district,23 and the Mississippi statute requires notice of a
public hearing before a district is created.24 Both the Mississippi and
Nebraska statutes stipulate the membership and terms of members of a
local historic district commission,25 and whether or not the power of
eminent domain may be used.26 Furthermore, in both Alaska2 7 and
Mississippi,2 the local commission is required to consult with a state
agency prior to creating the district.
By contrast, the District of Columbia, Indiana, and Iowa statutes are
far more elaborate, containing provisions typical of their type. The his-
toric districts may be created by local governing bodies29 although
Iowa authorizes their creation by majority vote in a referendum follow-
ing a petition of ten percent of the residents.3" As is customary in his-
12. For a discussion of historic district legislation as of 1975, see Beckwith, supra note 1. at
95-98.
13. ALASKA STAT. § 29-33.090 (1972 & Supp. 1979); Id. §§ 29.48.108-.110 (Supp. 1979); Id.
§ 41.35.180(5) (1977); Id. §§ 45.98.010-.070 (Supp. 1979).
14. Historic Landmark and Historic District Protection Act of 1978 (Bill 2-367, adopted Nov.
23, 1978).
15. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 18-4-22-1 to -12, -7-22-1 (Burns Supp. 1978).
16. IOwA CODE ANN. §§ 303.20-.33 (West Supp. 1979).
17. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 39-31-1 to -9 (Supp. 1978).
18. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 14-2001- to -2004 (1977).
19. No. 66, 1978 Ala. Acts 1751. Preservation districts, existing alongside historic districts,
are intended to preserve Mobile's architectural heritage in new and growing neighborhoods with a
unique character.
20. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-395 to -399 (Supp. 1979).
21. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 45-24.1-14 to -16 (Supp. 1978).
22. ALASKA STAT. §§ 29.48.108-. 110 (Supp. 1979); Miss. CODE ANN. § 39-13-3 (Supp. 1978);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 14-2001 to -2002 (1977).
23. ALASKA STAT. § 29.48.110(b) (Supp. 1979).
24. MISS. CODE ANN. § 39-13-3 (Supp. 1978).
25. Id. § 39-13-5; NEB. REV. STAT. § 2002 (1977).
26. MISS. CODE ANN. § 39-13-9 (Supp. 1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-2003 (1977).
27. ALASKA STAT. § 29.48.110 (Supp. 1979).
28. MISS. CODE ANN. § 39-13-7 (Supp. 1978).
29. District of Columbia, Historic Landmark and Historic District Protection Act of 1978,
§ 4(a)(3), (Nov. 28, 1978); IND. CODE ANN. § 18-7-22-3 (Burns Supp. 1978).
30. IOWA CODE ANN. § 303.21-.25 (West Supp. 1979).
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toric districts,3 these new statutes authorize aesthetic regulation by
means of a certificate of appropriateness issued by the local historic
district commission.32 Denials of applications must be justified,33 and
provision is made for showings of economic hardship.34
Two subsections of the District of Columbia and Indiana statutes
depart from prior practice. From the standpoint of remedies, the D.C.
statute is unique in that any party that demolishes a property in viola-
tion of the ordinance may be required to rebuild the property as it ex-
isted prior to the demolition. 35 This provision is apparently the first of
its kind in the country. The Indiana statute contains an innovative rec-
itation of design considerations to guide development in the historic
districts.36
In contrast to state statutes authorizing historic districts are those
that authorize the local designation of individual landmarks. At least
twenty states3 7 have enacted such laws either as separate legislation or
as part of a law authorizing local historic districts. Landmark designa-
tion employs the police power in the same way historic district designa-
tion does, and state landmark statutes are as diverse as those
authorizing historic districts.
Prior to the Penn Central case isolated historic landmarks, especially
those in urban areas, posed more troublesome legal questions than the
larger historic districts. Since 1975 at least two jurisdictions, the Dis-
trict of Columbia and Mississippi, have authorized the designation of
historic landmarks.38 In light of the Penn Central decision, it is reason-
able to anticipate further landmarks designation.
One state, North Carolina, experienced a total revision of existing
legislation. In 1979, the North Carolina General Assembly rewrote the
historic district and landmarks statutes, the revisions of which are dis-
cussed at length elsewhere.39
31. See J. BECKWITH, supra note 3, at 2-3.
32. District of Columbia, Historic Landmark and Historic District Protection Act of 1978,
§§ 5(a), 6(a), 7(a), 8(a) (Nov. 28, 1978); IND. CODE ANN. § 18-7-22-8 to -10 (Bums Supp. 1978);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 303.27-.30 (West Supp. 1979).
33. District of Columbia, Historic Landmark and Historic District Protection Act of 1978,
§§ 5(d), 6(d), 7(d), 8(d) (Nov. 28, 1978); IND. CODE ANN. § 18-7-22-10 (Bums Supp. 1978); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 303.30 (West Supp. 1979).
34. District of Columbia, Historic Landmark and Historic District Protection Act of 1978,
§§ 5(e)-(g), 6(e)-(g), 7(e)-(f) (Nov. 28, 1978); IND. CODE ANN. § 18-7-22-11 (Bums Supp. 1978);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 303.30 (West Supp. 1979).
35. District of Columbia, Historic Landmark and Historic District Protection Act of 1978,
§ l(b) (Nov. 28, 1978).
36. IND. CODE ANN. § 18-7-22-11 (Bums Supp. 1978).
37. See statutory appendix infra.
38. District of Columbia, Historic Landmark and Historic District Protection Act of 1978,
§ 4(c)(3) (Nov. 28, 1978); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-1 to -5 (Supp. 1979).
39. Morgan, Reaffirmation of Local Initiative: North Carolina's 1979 Historic Preservation
Legislation, 11 N.C. CENT. L.J. 243 (1980).
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B. Constitutional Issues. Procedural Due Process and Economic
Hardship
Constitutional questions centering on historic district zoning and
landmark designation have evolved significantly since 1975, with new
questions arising as old ones seem settled. For example, although the
propriety of using the police power for preservation purposes now
seems assured, this very success has given rise to problems of procedu-
ral due process in the management of historic district and landmarks
commissions.4
By 1975 the propriety of the police power for preservation purposes
was largely settled. Historic preservation was accepted as part of the
"general welfare" embraced by the police power.4 While aesthetics
was important, the courts tended to stress the importance of economics
and commercial benefits, especially from the tourist industry.4 2
Since 1975 state courts have continued to uphold the constitutional-
ity of historic district legislation.43 Interestingly, in A-S-P Associates v.
City of Raleigh,4 the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the use of
the police power a" in a historic district that was not a tourist attrac-
tion.46 Furthermore, the case illustrates, in a manner reminiscent of
Euclid v. Amber Realty Co. , the curious dispensation given the police
power in land-use cases by courts that are prone to invoke the doctrine
of substantive due process to invalidate economic regulation.
By upholding the Oakwood ordinance, the North Carolina Supreme
Court went beyond the older cases. Oakwood, a late nineteenth-cen-
tury neighborhood east of the state capitol, 48 was not a tourist attrac-
tion like Boston's Beacon Hill, New Orleans's Vieux Carrd or Santa
Fe's adobe district. Nonetheless, the court recognized that preservation
was permissibly within the police power because it promoted cultural
values, urban revitalization, and architectural creativity. This construc-
tion of the general welfare will become more apposite because most
historic districts now being created are not tourist attractions but are,
rather, part of the fabric of typical living communities, perhaps cher-
ished by their residents but not cultivated by outside visitors. Thus, the
40. See, e.g., Stipe, A Decade of Preservation and Preservation Law, 1 I N.C. CENT. L.J. 214
(1980).
41. Beckwith, supra note I, at 101.
42. Id.
43. See e.g., Figarsky v. Norwich Historic District Commission, 171 Conn. 198, 368 A.2d 163
(1976); A-S-P Associates v. City of Raleigh, 298 N.C. 207, 258 S.E.2d 444 (1979).
44. 298 N.C. 207, 258 S.E.2d 444 (1979).
45. Id. at 216, 258 S.E.2d at 450.
46. Id. at 210, 258 S.E.2d at 446-67.
47. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
48. Harris, The Oakwood Historic District, N.C. ARCHITECT, July-Aug. 1975, at 7.
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A-S-P case will strengthen the use of the police power for preservation
purposes to the extent that it dispenses with the "tourist rationale."
In Euclid, the United States Supreme Court upheld the general zon-
ing power. In both Euclid and A-S-P, land use regulation was upheld
by a court sympathetic to substantive due process. Euclid was decided
in 1926 at the height of the 1904-1933 substantive due process era; yet
Justice Sutherland, after expounding on the increasing complexity of
urban life,49 found the question to be fairly debatable and deferred to
the legislature. Sutherland's basic assumption was wrong, of course,
because complexity is hardly a compelling basis for the assertion of the
police power. His was the common rationalistic fallacy of believing
that something must be done consciously and by design to insure an
orderly society. On the contrary, given the inherent limitations of the
human mind, spontaneous decentralized institutions such as the free
market are essential to the creation of an orderly society that is the
result of human action but not of human design.5" The coordination
problem of atomistic knowledge makes central planning impossible,
and the history of the administration of zoning laws largely bears this
out.
5'
The A-S-P case follows Euclid's relaxed standard of judicial review.
It has long been observed that state courts continue to apply the doc-
trine of substantive due process long after its rejection by the United
States Supreme Court.52 The Supreme Court of North Carolina has
been pre-eminent in its adherence to the doctrine,53 as most recently
shown in In Re Aston Park Hospital, Inc.54 Yet this same court in A-S-
P had no difficulty in holding that historic preservation was a permissi-
ble use of the police power. Indeed, the court specifically declined to
review the substantive wisdom of the historic district ordinance.55
Thus the same double standard found in Euclid during the Lochner era
was reasserted in North Carolina in A-S-P during the Aston Park era.
Historic preservation as a permissible objective for the use of the po-
lice power seems assured, but this very success will likely raise future
problems of procedural due process. For example, while the standard
49. 272 U.S. at 386-87.
50. This insight is, of course, basic to the scholarly work of Friedrich Hayek.
5 1. B. SIEGAN, supra note 9; Gramm & Ekelund, Land Use Planning- The Market Alternative
in No LAND IS AN ISLAND 127-40 (Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1975).
52. Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L.
REV. 873 (1976); Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L.
REV. 91 (1950).
53. Howard, supra note 52, at 879-91; Paulsen, supra note 52, at 104-05; Comment, Hospital
Regulation after Aston Park: Substantive Due Process in North Carolina, 52 N.C.L. REV. 763
(1974).
54. 282 N.C. 542, 193 S.E.2d 729 (1973).
55. 298 N.C. at 217, 258 S.E.2d at 450.
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of judicial review of decisions by preservation commissions apparently
is not rigorous, it is not without limits. As the standard of review ar-
ticulated by Justice Braucher in Gumley v. Board of Selectmen56 makes
clear, 57 a complete and comprehensive record is essential to any preser-
vation commission decision.58 Given the lay membership of most pres-
ervation commissions, casual concern for legal formalities may be
expected.
In addition to the expected state court focus on procedural due proc-
ess, the Penn Central case insures future litigation of the issue of eco-
nomic hardship. The older state court police-power cases, as well as
the more recent gloss added by such cases as A-S-P, did not address the
constitutional status of historic preservation laws under the fifth
amendment of the federal Constitution. Apparently, this question has
been given a definitive answer in Penn Central. In brief, the Court up-
held the New York City Landmark Preservation Commission's refusal
to allow the construction of a tall office building on the site of Grand
Central Station, a designated New York City landmark. By a six to
three vote, the Court held that the restrictions of the city ordinance,
enacted pursuant to the state statute, did not constitute a "taking" of
property for which compensation must be paid. The Court's approval
of landmark regulation will certainly have a great impact on the will-
ingness of local governments to enact such laws. In presenting their
arguments in support of landmark designation, preservation interests
will find their legal position enhanced. Thus, historic preservation will
become an even more influential consideration in controlling the use of
land.59
To be sure, preservation will be a more influential consideration, but
not one without limits. The ordinance upheld in Penn Central pro-
vided that certificates of appropriateness should be granted if the appli-
cant can show that landmark designation would result in undue
economic hardship, a burden not carried by the Penn Central Trans-
portation Company. The Court held that there was no taking because
the railroad had failed to show that it had been denied a reasonable
economic return in light of its transferable development rights. Some
state statutes and local ordinances already provide for a relaxation of
56. 371 Mass. 718, 358 N.E.2d 1011 (1977).
57. Id. at 724, 358 N.E.2d at 1015.
58. Indeed, as Russell Brenneman points out, the Figarsky case was won because of the com-
pleteness of the record made at the commission hearing. See R. BRENNEMAN, THE DEVELOP-
MENT AND SIGNIFICANCE OF FIGARSKY v. NORWICH HISTORIC DISTRICT COMMISSION (1976).
59. Such as in the preservation ordinances in the District of Columbia and in Louisville,
Kentucky, which were strengthened in keeping with the Penn Central decision. NATIONAL TRUST
FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, 5 LANDMARK AND HISTORIC DISTRICT COMMISSIONS No. 1 (Feb.
1979).
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requirements in cases of hardship6 ° and, given the sanction by the
Supreme Court, will increasingly do so in the future.6 The Court,
however, left unanswered the requirements for a showing of economic
hardship and left the door open for future litigation to flesh out the
meaning of the term.
Although procedural due process and economic hardship will likely
loom large in future preservation litigation, presumably it is clear that
the police power may be used with relative confidence in the preserva-
tion of historic districts and landmarks. But if preservationists have
won a major victory, it must still be asked: to be sure, the police power
may be used, but at what cost and to whom? The great benefits of
historic preservation are familiar enough: enhanced property values,
stabilized tax bases, and the ambiance of history and tradition. But
what certainty do we have that the benefits of an essentially political
methodology for allocating property rights will exceed the costs? Re-
strictions on historic landmarks and districts usually prevent the best
economic use of the property. Isolated landmarks present the most
acute problems of efficient use of land, quite graphically illustrated by
Grand Central Station which more than likely will never provide any
services other than as a Beaux Arts structure. In a city already devas-
tated by the politics of rent control, any further limitations on the mar-
ket mechanism must be greeted with mixed feelings at best. To this
observer, the holding of the Penn Central case is regrettable and will
accelerate the politicization of economic decisions with its attendant
inefficiencies and attenuation of individual autonomy.
C. Public Preservation Agencies
The passage of the National Historic Preservation Act of 196662 and
the growth of the environmental protection movement have en-
couraged most states to establish some form of state preservation
agency.63 All of them have appointed a state historic preservation of-
ficer (hereinafter referred to as SHPO) to implement state responsibili-
ties under the 1966 Act. Most of the preservation agencies are public
60. Typical is a Virginia statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-503.2 (Supp. 1979), which allows the
owner of a designated historic landmark to demolish it if he has applied to the governing body for
demolition permission and, following a denial, has given the governing body a right of first refusal
to buy the landmark for the required length of time, but with no executed contract of sale result-
ing.
61. The Illinois landmark statute was recently amended to explictly incorporate the Penn
Central holding so that the denial of a demolition permit for a landmark building "shall not
constitute a taking . . . unless . . . [it] deprives the owner of all reasonable beneficial use or
return." P.A. 81-560, 1979 Ill. Legis. Serv. 1273 (West).
62. Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915-19 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470, 470a, 470b, 470c-470n).
63. For references to the relevant state statutes as of 1975, see Beckwith, supra note 1, at 182-
9
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bodies funded through state tax revenues, but some are quasi-public
organizations chartered and perhaps subsidized by the states.
The public agencies in the various states generally have similar func-
tions: 64 acquiring and preserving historic sites and archaeological re-
mains, accepting gifts and encouraging interest in historic preservation,
conducting research and surveying historic resources, and erecting his-
torical markers. Most states authorize the maintenance of a state regis-
ter of historic places, and the head of the agency often acts as the
SHPO.
Some state agencies are authorized specifically to cooperate in imple-
menting either or both federal and local preservation laws. The rela-
tively new statutes of a number of states, such as Alaska,65 Indiana,66
Kentucky,67 and Utah,68 explicitly provide for state participation in im-
plementing the 1966 Act, including nominations to the National Regis-
ter of Historic Places. Some states, such as Alaska69 and Connecticut,7 °
specifically authorize the state agency to consult with localities about
creating historic districts, reviewing the adverse impact of proposed ac-
tions on local historic resources, and granting financial assistance in the
form of loans or grants in aid.
While the state agencies basically have similar functions, they also
carry out work unique to their states. For example, some states, espe-
cially in the West, link preservation activities to the state park system.
To illustrate, Arizona's State Parks Board maintains the state register
of historic places.7' In other states, such as Nebraska,72 North Caro-
lina,7 3 and South Carolina,74 the agencies function as the state archives,
one of the more traditional state undertakings antedating the advent of
the police power.
Since 1975 there has been an increase in the number of state public
agencies that deal exclusively with preservation matters. At least
twelve states and one territory (Arkansas, 75 Guam,
76 Hawaii,7 7 Idaho,78
64. See generally statutory appendix infra.
65. ALASKA STAT. § 41.35.180 (1977).
66. IND. CODE ANN. § 14-3-3.3-3(a) (Bums Supp. 1979).
67. Ky. REV. STAT. § 171.382 (1980).
68. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-18-38 (1978).
69. ALASKA STAT. § 41.35.180(5) (1977).
70. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-147b(c) (1972).
71. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-511.04(8) (West Supp. 1979).
72. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 82-104 to -108 (1976).
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 121-1 to -21 (1974 & Supp. 1979); id. §§ 143B-92 to -110 (1978 &
Supp. 1979).
74. S.C. CODE §§ 60-11-10 to -90 (1976).
75. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-904 to -913 (Supp. 1979).
76. GUAM GOV'T CODE §§ 13985-13985.14 (Supp. 1974).
77. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 6E-1 to -39 (1976).
78. IDAHO CODE §§ 67-4123 to -4130 (1973 & Supp. 1979).
10
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Illinois,79 Indiana,8 ° Kansas, 8' Montana,82 Nevada, 83 New Hamp-
shire,84 Utah,85 Vermont,86 and Washington87) have created state pres-
ervation agencies. These separate agencies carry on some
responsibilities (especially regarding archaeological and historic sites)
formerly vested in agencies less specifically organized for preservation
purposes. These agencies are increasingly assuming new responsibili-
ties that reflect recent initiatives in preservation law, such as imple-
menting preservation incentives of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,88
assisting local governments in the creation of historic districts, and car-
rying out new and expanded state responsibilities for the preservation
of historic resources. In some states, for example, the regulatory power
of the agencies can be invoked to require review of public, publicly
funded, or licensed projects affecting properties given special legal sta-
tus by listing in the state register or by location in a state historic dis-
trict.
As state preservation law becomes more complex, the tasks of state
agencies become more specialized. In response to this trend, some of
the more recent statutes create state preservation agencies with special-
ized subdivisions.89 Growth of state preservation agencies should not
be unexpected. This growth is consistent with the diffuse costs and con-
centrated benefits characteristic of governmental regulation generally.9 °
With a growing constituency within the agencies and among owners of
historic property, the preservation bureaucracy approximates the tradi-
tional model of a bureaucracy run primarily for the benefit of its mem-
bers and their stronger client groups-in this case, the preservationists.
As in many instances of governmental regulation, their interests are
congruent. Furthermore, growth of the preservation bureaucracy will
likely continue as state and local preservation initiatives accelerate in
response to the sanction given by the Supreme Court in Penn Central.
79. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 133dl-d14 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
80. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 14-3-3.3-1 to -14 (Burns Supp. 1979).
81. KAN. STAT. §§ 75-2715 to -2725 (1977 & Supp. 1979).
82. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3-422 to -442 (1979).
83. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 383.011-.021(1977), as. amended, ch.102, § 1, 1979 NEV. STATS. 159;
ch. 179, § 1, 1979 NEV. STATS. 269.
84. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 227-C:1-9 (1978).
85. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-18-2.1 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
86. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 721-23, 741-43 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
87. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.51A.00-.140 (Supp. 1979).
88. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
89. E.g., the Indiana Division of Historic Preservation includes four subdivisions dealing
respectively with archaeology, registration and survey, museums, and historic sites and structures.
Similarly, the Iowa State Historical Department is segmented into the divisions of historical muse-
ums and archives, state historical society, and historic preservation.
90. See text accompanying notes 202-06 infra.
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D. Governmental Review of Public and Private Action
Many kinds of actions may have an impact on historic resources.
Just as governments may encounter historic property as a result of pub-
lic projects, such as road construction, so too private actions may have
an adverse affect. In recent years, states have been more directly in-
volved in regulating governmental projects and, in some cases, private
actions that may endanger historic structures and sites. At least twenty
states now have statutes authorizing or requiring review of proposed
projects that may have an impact on archaeological and historic re-
sources.91
The earliest laws of this kind scrutinized the adverse effects of gov-
ernmental projects, particularly road construction, on archaeological
sites. The simplest of these statutes92 are permissive, and authorize co-
operation among governmental agencies to minimize the adverse im-
pact of state projects on archaeological remains. Salvage by the state
archaeologist is often authorized. Some states, however, have moved
beyond authorizing salvage work to requiring it. Alaska, for example,
requires that if a public construction project is proposed on any his-
toric, prehistoric, or archaeological site, the project may not commence
until salvage work is completed.93 If the site is discovered during con-
struction, the state's Department of Natural Resources must be notified
and its concurrence obtained for continuing the project.9" If the re-
quired concurrence is not obtained within ninety days, the agency or
person performing the construction may appeal to the governor for a
final decision.95
The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966,96 the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act of 1969,9' and the Department of Transportation
Act of 196698 each set up a mechanism for reviewing the impact of
federally related projects on historic structures and sites. Recent state
statutes modeled after these federal laws have added a new dimension
to the review of proposed public and private actions. Some states, such
as Kansas9 9 and Hawaii,"° amended their salvage statutes to require
added protective scrutiny for historic properties listed on the state or
91. See statutory appendix infra.
92. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-1006 (1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-813 (1975); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 305A.5 (West Supp. 1979); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 27, § 374 (1974).
93. ALASKA STAT. § 41.35.070(c) (1977).
94. Id. § 41.35.070(d) (1977).
95. Id. § 41.35.070(e) (1977).
96. Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915-17 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470n).
97. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4347).
98. Pub. L. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931 (codified in scattered sections of 3, 5, 10, 15, 18, 23, 29, 33, 40,
42, 49, 50 U.S.C.).
99. KAN. STAT. § 75-2724 (1977).
100. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 6E-8 to -10 (1976).
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National Registers. The procedure in Kansas is modeled on Section
4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act. State or local govern-
mental work in Kansas affecting a historic site may not proceed until
the governor or local governing body finds that there is no feasible and
prudent alternative to the project, and that it includes all possible plan-
ning to minimize harm to the site. '0' Appeal in either case may then be
had to the district court having jurisdiction in the county in which the
historic site is located.'° 2 Hawaii models its regulation on Section 106
of the National Historic Preservation Act, but also extends the scope of
regulation to include private action affecting any historic property in
the Hawaii Register of Historic Places. 03 To allow time for review, a
landowner must notify Hawaii's Department of Land and Natural Re-
sources of any proposed construction.' °4 The construction may not
commence or, in the event that it has already begun, continue until the
department has given its concurrence or ninety days have elapsed,
whichever occurs sooner.0 5 Within the ninety days the state must ei-
ther begin condemnation proceedings for the purchase of the property,
permit the project to begin, or undertake salvage operations on the
site. io6
Perhaps the 1976 Illinois statute is the state law most explicitly pat-
terned after the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966.17 It estab-
lishes the Illinois Register of Historic Places 0 8 and the Illinois Historic
Sites Advisory Council,0 9 modeled respectively after the National
Register and federal Advisory Council on Historic Preservation that
were created in the 1966 Act. The Illinois state historic preservation
officer, who is also director of the state Department of Conservation,
designates places on the state register from nominations submitted by
the council." ° Designation as a Registered Illinois Historic Place in-
cludes an enumeration of the site's "Critical Historic Features," which
thereafter may not be substantially altered or demolished without a
Certificate of Compliance from the SHPO."' A person who wants to
demolish a critical historic feature must give notice of intent to the De-
partment of Conservation and must post notice at the site. l" 2 Within
101. KAN. STAT. § 75-2724 (1977).
102. Id.
103. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 6E-8 to -10 (1976).
104. Id. § 6E-8(a) (1976).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. For a discussion of the Illinois statute see Comment, Historic Preservation in Illinois, 1979
So. ILL. U.L.J. 449, 460-62.
108. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 133d6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
109. Id. § 133d3.
110. Id.
111. Id. § 133d7.
112. Id. § 133d8(a).
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thirty days of receipt of this notice, the SHPO or any individual may
request a meeting to discuss the proposed action." 3 The meeting must
be held within sixty days of request, and the topics to be discussed shall
include avoidance and minimization of adverse effects, methods of pre-
serving the structure or place, and possible alternatives to the proposed
action." 4 The SHPO must help interested parties explore every possi-
ble means for substantial preservation of the registered historic
place.' Within thirty days of the meeting, the SHPO must issue a
certificate of compliance allowing the project to proceed if it is deter-
mined (1) that the person filing notice of the proposed act has negoti-
ated in good faith and further negotiations would not be productive, (2)
that the proposed action would not have an impact significant enough
to warrant further delay, or (3) that the person filing notice agrees to
modifications of the proposed action specified by the SHPO." 6 The
SHPO, however, may delay issuance of a certificate for another ninety
days if he finds that none of the preceding grounds for issuance have
been met. 1 7 During this additional delay period, the SHPO may re-
quire negotiations to continue, and photographs and measured draw-
ings may be made as a lasting record of the site." 8 After the ninety
days have elapsed without a certificate being issued, the SHPO must
issue a certificate at the applicant's request."19
Projects financed wholly or in part by state funds are subject to a
stricter test under the Illinois law. Those projects that will have an ad-
verse economic or environmental impact on registered historic places
are not permitted at all unless the SHPO finds that (1) the project is
necessary for the public benefit, (2) the project cannot be carried out
practically so as to avoid the adverse effect, and (3) the adverse effect is
minimized to the maximum extent feasible.
120
The growing number of state environmental laws patterned after the
National Environmental Policy Act offer another kind of regulatory
protection for historic properties.' 2 ' These state laws afford protection
of resources to the extent that these resources are viewed as part of the
environmental values governed by the statute. The purposes, stated in
the preambles of such statutes or in the definitions sections, often ex-
plicitly include the protection of historic sites and values.1
22
113. Id. § 133d8(b).
114. Id. § 133d8(c).
115. Id. § 133d8(d).
116. Id. § 133d8(d)().
117. Id. § 133d8(d)(3).
118. Id.
119. Id. § 133d8(f).
120. Id. § 133d9.
121. See statutory appendix infra.
122. A California court recently held that an environmental statute that defined "environ-
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Most of the twenty states with such laws require environmental im-
pact assessments prior to the issuance of permits when state action is
involved. A few states, such as Minnesota, 23 also scrutinize private
actions that may have an adverse environmental impact and grant
standing to individuals and groups seeking to enforce the laws. Colo-
rado authorizes designation of "areas of state interest," defined to in-
clude areas "containing, or having a significant impact upon, historical,
natural, or archaeological resources of statewide importance."1 24 These
resources include properties listed in the National Register, designated
by state statute, or included in a list of historically and architecturally
significant places compiled by the state historical society.' 25 Once the
areas of state interest are designated, permits for development are re-
quired from the local government in whose jurisdiction the develop-
ment is to take place.
126
E. State Financial Assistance
Public funding for preservation purposes varies among the states, re-
flecting the political influence of preservationists and the climates of
public choice prevailing in the various legislatures. Until recently most
state financial assistance for historic preservation took the form of au-
thorizations for city and county governments to appropriate funds for
historical purposes, often pursuant to specific tax levies. Since 1975,
however, some states, notably Alaska, 27 Colorado,'28 and South Da-
kota, 129 have authorized state-funded loans for preservation purposes,
while Maine has authorized savings banks to invest up to five percent
of their deposits in preservation-related investments in real property.'
30
The South Dakota historic preservation loan fund provides loans to
purchase, restore, or develop historic South Dakota structures for resi-
dential or commercial use.' 3 ' The Alaska historic district revolving
loan fund is authorized to make loans for the restoration, improvement,
rehabilitation, or maintenance of eligible structures. 3 2 The South Da-
kota statute is more restrictive than that of Alaska in eligibility require-
ment" to include "objects of historic or aesthetic significance" was applicable to and required the
protection of archaeological sites. Society for Calif. Archaeology v. Butte County, 65 Cal. App. 3d
832, 837, 135 Cal. Rptr. 679, 682 (1977).
123. MINN. STAT. § 116B.03 (1977).
124. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-65.1-201(c) (Supp. 1979).
125. Id. § 24-65.1-105(b).
126. Id. § 24.65.1-501.
127. ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.98.010-.070 (Supp. 1979).
128. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-49-101 to -118 (Supp. 1978).
129. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 1-19A-13.1 to -13.5 (Supp. 1979).
130. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 9-B, § 543 (Supp. Pamph. 1978).
131. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-19A-13.1 (Supp. 1979).
132. ALASKA STAT. § 45.98.020 (Supp. 1979).
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ments and the amount of assistance available for one property. Only
actual or potentially eligible National Register properties may receive
loans in South Dakota,'33 while in Alaska loans may be made to
properties (1) within a historic district established pursuant to the state
enabling statute, (2) deemed "important" in state or national history,
and (3) within a historic district and suitable for modification to con-
form to the style of the surrounding buildings in the district.
34
In South Dakota a maximum of $25,000 may be loaned at an annual
interest rate of one-fourth the prime rate for up to ninety percent of the
cost of purchase, restoration, and development of a structure.' 35 A
property receiving a loan under this statute must be encumbered with a
covenant running with the land to protect its restored features. 136 In
Alaska the loans must be secured by collateral and may not exceed
eighty-five percent of the appraised value of the collateral. 37 No one
historic district may receive more than $1,500,000 in loans and no one
property more than $100,000.138 The interest rate may not exceed
seven and one-half percent, 139 and the state retains a lien on the prop-
erty as collateral.140 The state's lien is superior to the lien of the par-
ticipating financial institution, '4' and both of these liens are superior to
all other liens except those for taxes and special assessments.142 If the
maintenance or rehabilitation of the historic property fails to conform
to the requirements of the loan, the interest rate is increased to the
maximum legal rate available under state law, 14 3 and a penalty is as-
sessed equal to two percent of the balance of the loan."44
Although the Colorado statute 45 is not explicitly for historic preser-
vation purposes, it may be of interest to preservationists. The purpose
of the statute is to stimulate the flow of private investment capital into
the financing of older housing. It authorizes creation of the Colorado
Older Housing Preservation Corporation, which may make mortgage
loans and insurance available for the purchase, repair, or rehabilitation
of an owner-occupied structure that is thirty years old or older, is used
primarily as a residence, and is located in a recorded subdivision plat in
which at least fifty percent of the residential housing structures are
133. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 1-19A-13.2 (Supp. 1979).
134. ALASKA STAT. § 45.98.020 (Supp. 1979).
135. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § i-19A-13.3 (Supp. 1979).
136. Id. § 1-19A-21.
137. ALASKA STAT. § 45.98.040(3) (Supp. 1979).
138. Id. § 45.98.040(l)-(2).
139. Id. § 45.98.040(4).
140. Id. § 45.98.040(6).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. § 45.98.060.
144. Id.
145. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-49-101 to -118 (Supp. 1979).
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thirty years old or more. 14
6
Although the mortgage program apparently has not been imple-
mented, the prospect of being forced to extend financing for it caused
Denver banks to form their own risk pool. As of March 1979, the pool
had made 407 high-risk loans with no defaults. These loans, along with
the work of historic district and landmark commissions, are having a
significant impact on older Denver neighborhoods.
147
These subsidy programs are typical governmental responses to in-
tense producer coalitions-in this case, the preservationists. Instead of
preservationists bearing the full costs of indulging their tastes, preserva-
tion projects are publicly financed from general tax revenues. This
transfer of wealth is consistent with a generalized view of economic
regulations suggesting that, as a result of its diffuse costs and concen-
trated benefits, intense producer coalitions may impose the costs of
their preferences on society as a whole. 48 Because the cost to any one
person of financing the transfer payments to the preservationists is so
small, it is irrational for any single taxpayer to oppose the transfer. On
the other hand, the preservationists have every incentive to lobby for
the subsidy because the concentrated benefits to them exceed the costs
of lobbying. Subsidies to preservationists represent yet another exam-
ple of the trend toward the growth of government and its attendant
wealth transfers.
F. Local Building Codes
By their very nature historic structures exhibit the building tech-
niques of particular periods in the past. The older a structure is, the
more likely it is that its preservation or rehabilitation will conflict with
local building codes, whose requirements for construction and mainte-
nance are typically stringent. For example, building codes prevent
preservation and rehabilitation efforts by requiring building materials
or archaic construction techniques that are unsuitable for older historic
structures and greatly increase rehabilitation costs.
Since 1975 Connecticut and Hawaii have joined California, Idaho,
Massachusetts, and South Dakota in adopting statutes to reconcile
preservation and building codes. Using identical language, Idaho and
South Dakota authorize the governing body of any city or county to
exempt historic property from applicable health or building codes to
the extent that enforcement would prevent or seriously hinder its pres-
146. Id. § 7-49-102(2).
147. Denper's Inner City Enjoys a Resurgence, Aided by Area's Boom, Housing Programs, Wall
St. J., Mar. 3, 1979, at 40, col. 1.
148. See text accompanying notes 190-206 infra.
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ervation. 19 In 1976 Hawaii authorized the governing body of any po-
litical subdivision to modify local building code provisions for the
protection, enhancement, preservation, and use of historic proper-
ties.' In 1977 Connecticut authorized revisions to the state building
code to allow exemptions for historic structures as defined under state
law and listed in the state register of historic places.' 15  Under Massa-
chusetts law, the requirements of any historic district statute, ordi-
nance, or bylaw prevails over the state building code.'52 It should be
noted that some local historic preservation ordinances in Massachusetts
provide a similar exemption. 153 ' California undertakes the most ambi-
tious approach with a separate state historical building code. ' 54 The
statute authorizes the adoption of alternative rules, regulations, and
standards by state agencies and local building authorities applicable to
qualified historical structures 155 as defined under state law.'
5 6
Not only do local building codes discourage rehabilitation of old
buildings, they also inflate housing costs generally, frustrate design in-
novation, and foster corruption among local building inspectors. 1 Be-
cause building codes, particularly in urban areas, often are passed at
the behest of construction unions in order to prevent innovation and
the use of labor-saving building techniques (thus maximizing the de-
mand for labor), 58 the need to relax building codes for preservation
purposes appears even stronger.
The statutory relaxation of building codes for preservation purposes
clearly creates a desirable flexibility to encourage rehabilitation. It is
equally clear, however, that these enabling statutes do not go far
enough. Outright abolition of governmental building codes and pri-
vate enforcement of voluntary market-oriented building codes would
greatly encourage the preservation of historic buildings, yet guarantee
an adequate concern for safety. The promulgators of the private codes
would have every incentive to insure aesthetically sound, safe, and
cost-minimizing rehabilitations in keeping with the risk preferences of
preservationists. As employees of private firms, inspectors would ex-
hibit a concern for the purchaser of services-in this case, the preserva-
tionists-rather than the corruption so typical of the urban inspectors
149. IDAHO CODE § 67-4618 (Supp. 1979); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-19B-54 (1974).
150. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 6E-15 (1976).
151. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19 -3 9 5q, -403c, g (West Supp. 1979).
152. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 143, § 3A (West Supp. 1979).
153. Ch. 144, § 1, 1975 Mass. Acts 108.
154. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 18950-18960 (West Supp. 1979).
155. Id. § 18959.5.
156. Id. § 18955.
157. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEIGHBORHOODS WHITE HOUSE REPORT (1979).
158. R. CRASWELL, THE FAILURE OF FEDERAL HOUSING 20 (1977); R. POSNER, supra note 2,
at 245.
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employed by the local governmental monopoly. Innovation in code
services would flourish among the competing firms, leading to lower
costs for adaptive re-use of historic buildings.
III. PRIVATE PRESERVATION LAW AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT
Private agreements among individuals is the alternative to the police
power in the allocation of property rights. Although real property law
sanctions a wide variety of techniques for private planning, these de-
vices share one important characteristic: they are the non-coercive re-
sult of private agreement and are not a result of the sovereign power of
the state except in so far as remedies for breach are available in the
courts. As previously discussed, however, the greatest growth in preser-
vation law has been in the public sector and, in light of Penn Central,
this growth will likely continue for the foreseeable future.
The private law may be employed in various ways for the preserva-
tion of historic properties. Among them are powers of termination for
breach of condition,' 59 possibilities of reverter, 60 easements,' 61 real
covenants, 62 and equitable servitudes.' 63  These private-law devices
have particular requirements for their creation and enforcement,164
some of which impede their effectiveness as preservation devices. Par-
ticularly vulnerable are in-gross interests, such as negative facade ease-
ments and equitable servitudes.
This is not to say that the private law is irrelevant. Indeed, its under-
utilization is a source of concern to many. Nevertheless, even with this
growth of the public law, since 1975 the private law has been signifi-
cantly strengthened in six states.
To alleviate doubts about preservation easements and covenants, at
least nine states, 65 including four since 1975,166 have enacted statutes
159. Beckwith, supra note 1, at 127-29.
160. Id. at 129-30.
161. Id. at 130-33.
162. Id. at 135-38.
163. Id. at 138-40.
164. No attempt is made here to explain the traditional doctrines of future interests, ease-
ments, real covenants, or equitable servitudes. These traditional devices, with their advantages
and drawbacks, are usually available to preservationists and their lawyers, although with wide
variation among the jurisdictions. Instead, the focus of this section is quite narrow, and empha-
sizes only those statutes making specific changes in these private-law devices for preservation or
conservation purposes. Throughout this discussion, it should be kept in mind that the traditional
property law devices are still available.
165. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-1201 to -1206 (Supp. 1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-42a
to -42c (1978); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 85-1406 to -1410 (1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 11-48.2-
IA(2), (5), -2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); Id. ch. 30, §§ 401-06; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1252 (West
Supp. 1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, §§ 31-33 (West 1977 & Supp. 1979); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 477:45-47 (Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 121-34 to -42 (Supp. 1979); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 34-39-1 to -5 (Supp. 1979).
166. Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, and North Carolina.
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establishing the validity of "preservation restrictions." The principle
virtues of preservation restrictions are its ease of creation and enforce-
ability. 167
The four most recent statutes are typical of the type although they
differ significantly. First, the statutes differ as to terminology, authoriz-
ing the creation of facade and conservation "easements,"' 68 "conserva-
tion rights"' 69 in real property, "real rights,"' 7 and conservation and
preservation "agreements."' 7 ' This variety of terminology illustrates
the conceptual difficulties of eliminating the traditional distinctions be-
tween the various older real property devices. 7 2 The terminology dif-
fers, but their purpose is the same: to facilitate the private
encumbrance of historic property, primarily by making in-gross prop-
erty rights enforceable without regard to privity or appurtenancy.
17 3
Although their purposes are similar, the statutes differ as to who may
use these simplified conveyancing rules. Typically, 17' all four states au-
thorize charitable organizations and governmental bodies to convey
and enforce these interests. 
17
North Carolina, however, goes further and authorizes any corpora-
tion or business entity to enforce preservation agreements. 17' This in-
novation is enormously important because it authorizes a for-profit
firm to enforce preservation agreements, a service that could be offered
to consumers for a fee. If preservationists were willing to pay for serv-
ices of such a firm, then entrepreneurs might provide a private corpo-
rate alternative to a local political body. The firm would act on behalf
of its customers, many of whom might not own any property appurte-
nant to the restricted parcels, but who, nonetheless, would favor preser-
vation. Like any business firm, 17 7 the preservation firm would reduce
the transaction costs of private planning, costs that might be high in
older neighborhoods where there was no initial subdividing from a
large tract of land.' 78 As is often the case with municipal services, 17 9 a
167. Beckwith, supra note 1, at 141.
168. GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1407 (Supp. 1979).
169. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 401 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
170. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1252 (West Supp. 1979).
171. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-35 (Supp. 1979).
172. See Beckwith, supra note 1, at 127-40.
173. GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1408 (1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 401(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1252(B) (West Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-38 (Supp.
1979).
174. Beckwith, supra note I, at 14243.
175. GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1408 (1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 402 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1252(A) (West Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-35(2) (Supp.
1979).
176. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-35(2) (Supp. 1979).
177. R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 289-90.
178. Id. at 50.
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private firm might be able to enforce these preservation restrictions at
less cost than traditional political controls.
In the Georgia, Illinois, and North Carolina statutes, historic preser-
vation is linked with a concern for environmental quality. These stat-
utes authorize the creation of conservation "easements,"' 8 ° "rights,"''
and "agreements"' 8 2 in order to preserve natural, scenic, and open-
space areas. Thus private planning is simplified for preservationists
and conservationists alike. In 1976 Florida'83 enacted a similar statute
solely for conservation purposes.
It should be noted that preservation restrictions have their own tax
consequences. On the federal level, donation in perpetuity of preserva-
tion restrictions on historic property to charitable organizations entitles
the donor to a charitable deduction for federal income tax purposes. 184
Encumbering historic property with a preservation restriction also af-
fects its valuation for property tax purposes. The Georgia'8 5 and North
Carolina 186 statutes are typical of the states that, in passing laws recog-
nizing preservation restrictions, have also required that property tax as-
sessors at least consider the effect of the restrictions.
In considering the choice of methodology for achieving goals of his-
toric preservation, it is vitally important to notice that the simplification
of conveyancing of property rights discussed in this section has oc-
curred simultaneously with the expansion of zoning controls under the
police power sanctioned by the Penn Central case. This concurrent
growth of private and public methodologies graphically illustrates the
contrast between decentralized private action and centralized govern-
mental action and the economic and political consequences of the
choice to be made. At this point, then, it is appropriate to consider the
greater implications of the choice of legal methodology in historic pres-
ervation and of the role of preservationists in American society.
IV. FACTION, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND IDEOLOGY
As noted, since 1975 state and local preservation law has grown con-
siderably, with the greatest growth by far occuring through the exercise
of the police power within the public law. The creation of historic dis-
179. See White, Privatization of Municpally-Provided Services, 2 J. LIBERTARIAN STUDIES 187
(1978).
180. GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1407(c) (1978).
181. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-35(1) (Supp. 1979).
182. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 401(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
183. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 704.06 (1979).
184. I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii).
185. GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1409 (1978).
186. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-40 (Supp. 1979).
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tricts, 87 and designation of historic landmarks,' 88 and the public fund-
ing of preservation projects and revolving funds'89 typify the
morphology of growth of public preservation law. At first glance, those
who cherish American traditions might rejoice at such a concentrated
and successful effort to preserve the American past. Upon reflection,
however, it becomes clear that the growth of public preservation law,
far from being an example of stewardship of the past, is actually symp-
tomatic of an ominous transformation of the law and the politicization
of economic choice.
The first task then is to characterize the problem. What has hap-
pened to the law in our time? More particularly, what does preserva-
tion law purport to do and how? For whom does it purport to act and
at what cost? Secondly, consider the preservationists. Who are they,
and what values do they espouse? Are they the practitioners of private
initiative and the common law at its best, or do many of them have a
vested interest in governmental solutions? Why do so many preserva-
tionists favor statist solutions?
A. The Rise of Entrepreneurial Coalitions and the Enthronement of
Politics
To put the contemporary preservation movement in perspective, it is
instructive to consider two aspects of American life and governance
first and most admirably discussed in the eighteenth century. I refer, of
course, to American constitutionalism and the uniquely American af-
finity for local action by small groups. These characteristics, so admi-
rable and promising in their time, have given rise in our own time to
the very worst and the very best in the preservation movement.
American constitutionalism was concerned primarily with protecting
the freedom of the individual and encouraging economic growth.190 A
free society is not without its perils, however, and James Madison, in
his magnificent discussion in The Federalist, No. 10, cogently described
the dangers resulting from special interests. He was particularly appre-
hensive about the influence of factions. 9' For Madison, factionalism
was the worst possible ill that could afflict a free and democratic soci-
ety. While it was (and is) inescapable that various factions would have
187. See text accompanying notes 11-36 supra.
188. See text accompanying notes 37-38 supra.
189. See text accompanying notes 127-47 supra.
190. G. DIETZE, THE FEDERALIST-A CLASSIC OF FEDERALISM AND FREE GOVERNMENT
(1960); F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 176-92 (1960).
191. Madison defined faction as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or
minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of
interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community." Madison, The Federalist No. 10, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 42 (W. Brock ed.
1971).
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different views, Madison sought to devise a political system that would
control the effects of faction.' 92 To this end, Madison advocated a fed-
eral government and the separation of powers. Through these vertical
and horizontal restraints, he sought to prevent the monopolization of
the coercive power of the state and, by increasing the costs of political
entrepreneurship, to make it unprofitable for groups in society to redis-
tribute wealth through politics. 193 For over a century these impedi-
ments worked well enough' 9 4 in America and inhibited the
redistributive possibilities that are inherent in any democratic society.
In addition to constitutionalism, the American propensity for local
action deserves comment. The astute Frenchman, Alexis de Toc-
queville, in his classic, Democracy in America, noted that "[iun no
country in the world has the principle of association been more success-
fully used or applied to a greater multitude of objects than in
America. . . . [and] a vast number. . . are formed and maintained by
the agency of private individuals. '" De Tocqueville described an indi-
vidualistic people for whom self-reliance was a paramount virtue,'
96
and where one "looks upon the social authority with an eye of mistrust
and anxiety"' 97 and "claims its assistance only when he is unable to do
without it." 9 '
It is not surprising, then, that in this environment restraining faction
and encouraging individual initiative, the latter half of the nineteenth
century in the United States' 99 and in England 2" was a period of un-
paralleled growth and of minimal governmental regulation. Life ex-
pectancies increased, sanitation improved, and for the first time, the
majority of people had a life relieved of medieval poverty, disease, and
unending toil.
Unfortunately, our present century has brought a great transforma-
tion of interest-group politics-a transformation that has given rise to
the very factionalism Madison so feared. Economic controls reminis-
192. Id. at 44.
193. R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 491-93; North, Political Economy and Environmental Policies,
7 ENVIR'L LAW 449, 453 (1977).
194. This is not to say that subsidy was totally precluded. Several railroads were notoriously
successful in obtaining governmental largesse. C. CARSON, THROTTLING THE RAILROADS 24-37
(1971); Rand, Notes on the History of American Free Enterprise, in CAPITALISM: THE UNKNOWN
IDEAL 102-09 (A. Rand ed. 1962).
195. 1 A. DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 198 (P. Bradley ed. 1954). For a more
recent discussion of this "independent sector" separate from those of commerce or government.




199. J. HUGHES, THE GOVERNMENTAL HABIT 96-145 (1977).
200. R. HARTWELL, THE REVOLUTION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY LAW AND GOVERNMENT
(1979); T. ASHTON, THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 1760-1830 (1964); R. HARTWELL, THE INDUS-
TRIAL REVOLUTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (1971).
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cent of earlier mercantilism have returned,2"' and individual initiative
has declined as the local associations, described by de Tocqueville,
have been increasingly supplanted by the state.
Today, the political process is used robustly to redistribute wealth.
Largely a result of the concentrated benefits and diffuse costs of gov-
ernmental regulation,2" 2 individual producer coalitions,2"3 exhibiting
no restraint,204 go to the legislature for specific things. Rational vote-
maximizing politicians respond by giving them exactly what they want
in return for electoral support.205 Thus government grows inexorably
in response to the perverse incentives of political logic. Presumably
there is no end to the process, until perhaps the level of inflation or of
aggregate taxation required to finance governmental expansion reaches
such a level that the chronic free-rider problems of public choice are
overcome and the voters demand a reduction in expenditures.2 °6
One must, of course, move from generalizations to specifics. Having
described generally the decline of constitutional restraints and of indi-
vidual initiative and the rise of political entrepreneurship, one must
scrutinize the preservation movement.
It is all too apparent that many preservationists have succumbed to
the vice of faction and are deeply in error regarding legal methodology.
They resort to the public law in order to politicize economic choice
while alleging their service of the "public interest." To be sure, preser-
vation law produces benefits, but these benefits are far from randomly
distributed. Furthermore, preservation law has become an instrument
of coercion rather than a basis of private agreement. Financed on the
federal level by expansionary monetary policy, subsidies to preserva-
tionists contribute (as do all transfer payments) to an inflated currency
and a debilitated national defense. Regulatory costs drive up the cost
of housing and displace the poor.
In their zeal to preserve, preservationists contribute to the rationalis-
tic fallacy that through planning, government should "do something."
201. J. HUGHES, supra note 199, at 146-242; M. WEIDENBAUM, BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT, AND
THE PUBLIC (1977).
202. A. MELTZER, WHY GOVERNMENT GROWS (1976).
203. The concentrated benefits of regulation make it natural for producers, unlike consumers,
to intervene in the political process because the costs of intervention exceed the benefits obtained.
It is irrational for consumers to lobby against the subsidy because the cost of doing so exceeds the
tiny benefits to each consumer, and chronic free-rider problems encourage inaction. As a result,
the amorphous consumer interest is systematically underrepresented.
204. Burnham, The Breakdown ofRestraint, Wall St. J., Oct. 3, 1979, at 22, col. I.
205. F. Hayek, Economic Freedom and Representative Government, in NEW STUDIES IN PHI-
LOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 107-09 (1978); A. WALTERS, THE
POLITICIZATION OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS 10 (1976).
206. See, e.g., M. Friedman, The Limitations of Tax Limitation, in TAX LIMITATION, INFLA-
TION & THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 15-17 (1978); CAL. CONST. art. 13, § 12; TENN. CONST. art. 2,
§ 24.
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In this way, they perpetuate the widespread misconception that social
orders must be the conscious result of human design (often through
law) rather than the unintended, but orderly, results of spontaneous
human action.
Why do preservationists believe these things about the law? Do they
have a vested interest in governmental, as opposed to private, solu-
tions? At this point, a discussion of the recent emergence of the so-
called "new class"2 7 is warranted.
B. Historic Preservation and the New Class
The new class is the governmental-intellectual class, the tradesmen
in the commerce in ideas, whose influence has grown enormously since
World War II. Adept at manipulating ideas and symbols, the new class
has seen its influence enormously expanded through the national com-
munications media.20 8 The new class is affluent, well-educated, and
professional, and usually locates its center of power in the state. De-
pendent on central government spending for its livelihood and its aspi-
rations toward power and prestige, much of the new class is statist, and
is distinguished by its "hidden agenda of self-aggrandizement, its ad-
versarial posture against the central conceptions of our political, eco-
nomic, and cultural systems, and its attempts to shortcircuit the will of
the majority .... -209 By no means are all members of the new class
statist, however.
210
How many preservationists are statist members of the new class? To
answer this question, one must look at the various constituencies within
the preservation movement.
Those with the greatest stake in the expansion of the state are those
already either directly or indirectly employed in its service. Preserva-
tion professionals are employed in preservation agencies in all levels of
government.2 1' Secondly, other preservation professionals, such as
carpenters and design consultants, market restoration services to pri-
207. Although the term had its origin in the work of Milovan Djilas and has been popularized
most effectively by Irving Kristol, I would refer the reader to the recent writings of Michael No-
vak. See, e.g., M. NOVAK, THE AMERICAN VISION (1978).
208. Commentators such as Michael Novak and Malcolm Muggeridge have noted the influ-
ence of media figures and their consensus of secular, statist values. M. NOVAK, supra note 207, at
29. The exaggerated influence of the media is in part attributable to rational voter ignorance. The
rationally ignorant voter has little incentive to incur information costs because his single vote is
not likely to influence the outcome of an election. Therefore he relies on information provided at
no cost by the media. J. GWARTNEY, MICROECONOMics 64 (1977).
209. M. NOVAK, supra note 207, at 3 1.
210. A strong counter-attack is underway. See general,, G. NASH, THE CONSERVATIVE IN-
TELLECTUAL MOVEMENT IN AMERICA SINCE 1945 (1976).
211. On the federal level, one finds the Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service created
in 1978 as the umbrella organization of the Department of Interior. The National Trust for His-
toric Preservation also receives federal funding under the National Historic Preservation Act of
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vate parties and governmental projects. Architects are participating in
the spread of adaptive re-use of older buildings. Lawyers are discover-
ing the existence of preservation law as part of a traditional real prop-
erty and tax practice.2 2
A third statist constituency are the citizen-preservationists, ostensibly
private individuals who, like other regulated industries,2 13 may be sub-
sidized by public enforcement and various governmental programs.
While some preservationists undoubtedly have lobbied for income-
transfer programs, other may simply be responding to the incentives
created by enacted law, such as the grant-in-aid program under the
Historic Preservation Act of 1966.214
The preservationist intellectuals (both academic and journalistic)
form a fourth constituency of the preservation movement that supports
governmental expansion. Intellectuals are attracted to socialism for
many reasons,21 5 and there is no reason to suppose that preservationist
intellectuals are any different. Ambitious but risk-averse, the intellec-
tual tends to be a visionary who criticizes the existing (usually capitalis-
tic) order by recourse to an aspiration toward a vague (usually
socialistic) ideal. Many preservationist intellectuals seek a new society
of architectural permanence where spontaneous forces, especially the
market, are restrained, usually by force.
Envious of the material rewards of the business world but loathe or
unable to participate in its markets, which do not generally recognize
or reward alleged moral superiority, the intellectual sees governmental
expansion as the avenue to wealth, power, and prestige. Many
preservationist intellectuals resent the free market and the rewards
earned by the developer. With a heavy investment in human capital,
however, they must market their services as administrators or consul-
tants to that firm that will buy them. This firm is usually the state.
Academic commentators often prefer public-law solutions as a
1966. 16 U.S.C. § 470(a)(3). All of the states and territories have preservation agencies. See
statutory appendix infra. Many municipalities also have preservation professionals on their staffs.
212. The Practicing Law Institute has just issued its first volume on historic preservation law,
and several law schools were offering seminars in preservation law in the spring of 1980.
213. See R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 239-70.
214. 16 U.S.C. § 470 (a)-(e) (1976).
215. The study of the statist intoxication and baleful influence of intellectuals is an intriguing
subject in itself. Some of the more notable contributions to the literature include CAPITALISM AND
THE HISTORIANS (F. Hayek ed. 1963); L. MISEs, THE ANTI-CAPITALISTIC MENTALITY (1972); M.
NOVAK, supra note 207; R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 548-51; J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SO-
CIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 145-55 (1974); CAPITALISM: SOURCES OF HOSTILITY (E. van den
Haag ed. 1979); Bork, Can Democratic Government Survive?, in ASPECTS OF AMERICAN LIBERTY
174-86 (G. Corner ed. 1977); Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUDIES 1 (1977);
Coase, The Marketplacefor Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 384 (Papers &
Proceedings 1974); Director, The Parity ofthe Economic Market Place, 7 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1964);
Hayek, The Intellectuals and Socialism, 16 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1949); Roberts, The Failure ofthe
Intellectuals, in WILL CAPITALISM SURVIVE? 51-53 (E. Lefever ed. 1979).
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means of career advancement in a highly politicized society.216 One
can profitably ask whether this is true in historic preservation. In any
event, as verbalists trading in the commerce in ideas, the commentators
on historic preservation (who, no doubt, would object strenuously to
the issuance of certificates of appropriateness for the publication of
their articles) generally endorse stringent assertions of the police power
over property rights in historic areas.
Among many preservationists hostility toward the free market is in
part attributable to the ties of the preservation movement with the hu-
manities. Humanists have disliked the discipline of the marketplace
ever since the advent of the Industrial Revolution brought about the
rise of bourgeois capitalism. Resenting the downward mobility that re-
sulted from the loss of their feudal patrons, the humanist intellectuals
repudiated the market order and embraced socialism as a means of re-
storing aristocratic values and their own influence and prestige. To this
day, humanists often espouse aristocratic values while denouncing cap-
italism's alleged detraction from this lofty aspiration.21 7
Preservationist intellectuals are no exception. With their roots in the
aesthetic branch of humanism, they tend to deprecate commerce and its
response to the subjective preferences of mass taste.218 A concrete ex-
ample might prove helpful.
Previously, it was suggested that Sir Kenneth Clark's film series and
book Civilisation was an instructive example of the frequency with
which a preference for aesthetics and preservation is closely correlated
with an antipathy toward the market system. 219 This observation re-
ceived striking confirmation in Lord Clark's recent autobiography 220 in
which he discusses his views on economics. As an undergraduate at
Oxford, Lord Clark's thinking was profoundly influenced by John Rus-
kin, the well-known Fabian Socialist author and critic. It was Ruskin's
Unto This Last, which attacked not only capitalism as an economic
system but also modem art as a reflection of the ugliness of industrial
society, which proved to be a "revelation" in Clark. It was this "beauti-
fully simple and candid examination of the basic truths of econom-
ics"' 2 2 1 that brought about a "complete revolution" 222 in Clark's mind.
216. For a description of a similar problem in the realm of economics see W. HuTT, POLITI-
CALLY IMPOSSIBLE. . . ? 16-18 (1971).
217. M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 8 (1962).
218. Preservation cartoonists are forever decrying "commercial" ventures and "tacky" taste.
See, e.g., Preservation News, Aug. 1975, Nov. 1975, July 1977, Sept. 1977, Apr. 1978, Nov. 1978,
Jan. 1979, Feb. 1979, and June 1979.
219. Beckwith, supra note 1, at 149, n. 323.
220. K. CLARK, ANOTHER PART OF THE WOOD: A SELF-PORTRAIT (1975). For a discussion
of this characteristic in John Ruskin see Beckwith, supra note 1, at 148-50.
221. Id. at 112.
222. Id.
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The author of Civilisation closes with the following summary of the
influence the Fabian intellectuals had over him:
I have retained from those years of reading a hatred of exploitation that
has grown through the years. The sight of a lot of people dining in the
Savoy makes me feel sick. This is an emotional, almost physical, re-
sponse. . . . But somewhere in the back of my mind is a genuine ha-
tred of Power, Display, Big Business and all that goes with it.
2 2 3
While criticism of the Fabians is widespread 2 2 4 it suffices for our pur-
poses to say that Lord Clark's animus toward capitalism, particularly
his debilitating sense of guilt over the greater consumption made possi-
ble by an increased marginal productivity of labor,225 accounts in large
measure for Civilisation's negative image of capitalism and the result-
ing erroneous conclusion that it is inimical to our artistic and architec-
tural heritage.
C. Historic Preservation and the Market Process
As previously discussed, many preservationists have a vested interest
in governmental regulation and exhibit a morbid view of the market
process. Because of the endemic self-interest of such views, a realistic
appraisal of the compatibility of the preservation movement and the
market is essential.226
The preservation movement must recognize that its continued exist-
ence, as well as that of most things worth preserving in American soci-
ety, depend ultimately upon the survival of democratic capitalism.
Indeed, most of what preservationists revere was created as a result of
the free accumulation of capital in the past. Through the coordination
function of the price system, 227 the market fostered the creative powers
of architects and builders in the erection of countless structures. This
process, however, must not be halted simply because of the fixed pref-
erences of one time and place. If there is to be anything worth preserv-
ing in the future, today's society must be free to create those yet unbuilt
structures that will be tomorrow's landmarks. This can occur only in a
capitalist democracy.
Preservationists often perceive the market as a threat to historic
buildings. This perception stems from a definition of landmarks that is
static and unchanging and that ignores the creation of new structures.
To be sure, the market is a dynamic process that rewards change and
223. Id.
224. See, e.g., Stigler, Bernard Shaw, Sidney Webb, and the Theory of Fabian Socialism, in
ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF ECONOMICS (1965); Welch, Intellectuals Have Consequences, in THE
FUTURE THAT DOESN'T WORK (E. Tyrrell ed. 1977).
225. The economic historian R.H. Tawney shared a similar sense of guilt. Feuer, Some Irra-
tional Sources of Opposition to the Market System, in E. van den Haag, supra note 215, at 137.
226. For an earlier discussion see Beckwith, supra note 1, at 101-02.
227. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).
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innovation. The history of the growth of cities shows a constant evolu-
tion of land uses often resulting in the loss of historic structures.228 At
the same time, however, new structures were often built that in their
time became historic. History is always evolving and cumulative and
cannot be segmented.
Not all preservationists misunderstand the market process, however.
The views of the commercial preservationists provide a startling con-
trast to the anti-market preservation mainstream. The commercial
preservationists seek to preserve artifacts of a commercial and indus-
trial society, such as service stations, diners, neon signs, and the like.229
It is intriguing to note that the mainstream preservationists who dislike
the free market inevitably espouse fixed, aristocratic values, while the
commercial preservationists who understand the evolving market proc-
ess do not. As one commercial preservationist put it, "[t]he preserva-
tionist's instinct is to go out and freeze-dry it . . .but the commercial
environment isn't fixed in time. 13 ° These preferences echo the attrac-
tion of socialism for those who prefer a fixed, status society as opposed
to the fluid mobility of capitalist societies.
Of course, while anti-capitalism is often linked with aristocratic val-
ues, an aversion to mass taste is not necessarily a bad thing. Indeed, a
reverence for antiquity is an instructive and civilizing influence. On the
other hand, a socialized economy for the imposition of aristocratic val-
ues by force is abundantly a bad thing. The central problem is how the
tangible fabric of the past can be preserved to instruct the future with-
out repudiating the free economy essential to the creation of a future
society worth preserving. 23  This problem will be addressed at the
conclusion of the article, but not before one proposed future course for
the preservation movement is examined and rejected.
D. The Proposed Environmentalist-Preservationist Alliance
There are those who would have the historic preservation movement
ally itself with natural environmental groups, such as the Sierra Club.
They argue that it is a natural alliance between those who would pre-
serve the built environment and those who would preserve its natural
counterpart. Before any such alliance takes place, preservationists
228. E. BANFIELD, supra note 9, at 25-5 1.
229. To Preserve or Not? Thai is the Questionfor a Neo-Neon Age, Wall St. J., Mar. 28, 1980 at
1, col. 4.
230. Id. at 28, col. 1.
23 1. The ultimate irony would arise if, as a result of over-regulation supported by preserva-
tionists, capitalist enterprises were bankrupted, only then to be preserved as monuments by the
same preservationists. Although the reasons for its closing may not necessarily have been govern-
mental regulation, The Sloss Furnace in Birmingham, Alabama, a 118-year-old iron processing
furnace, is now being converted into a museum. The Chapel Hill Newspaper, June i, 1979 at 3A,
col. 1; Kulik, Birmingham, Am. Preservation, Feb.-Mar. 1978, at 20.
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should be aware of some of the characteristics of the environmental
lobby and how notoriously inadequate government has been in manag-
ing public lands.
First, consider the environmentalists as a group. They are hardly
representative of American society as a whole, being drawn primarily
from a strata of leisured, educated affluence.232 Many environmental-
ists are members of the new class who, having no need for upward
mobility, can afford to support policies that stifle economic growth.2 33
Many environmentalists are hostile toward the free market. Adept at
manipulating the political process, the environmental lobby enjoys an
influence far out of proportion to its numbers, and is able to impose
heavy regulatory costs on society as a whole.234 As major consumers of
recreation, the environmentalists advance their own self-interest by
preserving wilderness and park areas, which they preponderantly en-
joy. The poor, for example, rarely visit the more remote parks, and
increasing transportation costs have reduced their accessibility to the
middle class.
Secondly, one must consider government's competence in environ-
mental management. In its husbandry of natural areas, government
has proved itself adept at only two things: subsidizing political power-
ful groups and degrading and overusing the public lands committed to
its charge.
Consider, for example, governmental management of our national
parks, forests, and public grazing lands. In all of these areas access is
rationed at below-market prices. Subsidies are thereby conferred on
park visitors,235 timber harvesters, 236 and livestock ranchers. 237 Fur-
thermore, because the lands are publicly owned, no one has any incen-
tive to carefully husband the land. As a result of the lack of private
property rights, the parks are overcrowded,238 timber is overcut, 23 9 and
232. B. FRIEDEN, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION HUSTLE 130 (1979); R. SMITH, EARTH'S
RESOURCES: PRIVATE OWNERSHIP V. PUBLIC WASTE 50-56 (1979); Baden, Neospartan Hedonists,
Adult Toy Afficianados, and the Rationing of Pub/ic Lands, in MANAGING THE COMMONS 241-51
(G. Hardin & J. Baden eds. 1977); Chickering, Land Use Controls and Low Income Groups.- Why
Are There No Poor People in the Sierra Club?, in No LAND IS AN ISLAND 87-91 (Institute for
Contemporary Studies 1975).
233. Stfled Growth? Industrialists Losing War of the Wilderness as Combat Rages On, Wall St.
J., June 18, 1979, at 1., col. 1.
234. See generally, B. FRIEDEN, supra note 232; R. SMITH, supra note 232.
235. G. STANKEY & J. BADEN, RATIONING WILDERNESS USE: METHODS, PROBLEMS, AND
GUIDELINES (1977).
236. Baden & Stroup, Property Rights, Environmental Quality, and the Management ofNational
Forests, in MANAGING THE COMMONS 236-38 (G. Hardin & J. Baden eds. 1977); Stroup & Baden,
Externality, Property Rights, and the Management of Our National Forests, 16 J. L. & ECON. 303
(1973).
237. Baden & Stroup, supra note 236 at 238-40;
238. A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, UNIVERSITY ECONOMICS 154 (3d ed. 1972); D. NORTH & R.
MILLER, ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC ISSUES 95-98 (2d ed. 1973).
239. Baden & Stroup, supra note 236; Stroup & Baden, supra note 236.
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lands are overgrazed.24 °
Should the preservation movement ally itself with advocates of gov-
ernmental incompetence and narrow self-interest? Should it ally itself
with a lobby that is hostile toward a growing, free-enterprise economy,
and that has a vested interest in governmental regulation and a zero
growth rate? Should it ally itself with a statist lobby that imposes enor-
mous regulatory costs on society as a whole? Should it ally itself with a
lobby that holds itself out as advancing the public interest while stead-
fastly advancing no interest but its own?
The answer is obviously no. If the preservation movement is ever to
build itself upon sound principles of political economy, it must eschew
an alliance with the environmental extremists. Where then should the
future lead?
V. HISTORIC PRESERVATION, PUBLIC CHOICE, AND THE FUTURE
Scholarly articles usually conclude with a prescription of what the
law ought to be. Although this article is no exception, one must be
realistic in assessing the likelihood of meaningful change in light of the
realities of public choice. Given the incentive structure of present-day
preservation law and politics, one cannot be overly sanguine about the
effect that ideas will have on those who benefit from the concentrated
benefits of preservation regulation and subsidies. The beneficiaries of
political entrepreneurship are loathe to surrender their subsidies even
if, in the aggregate, an end to transfer legislation would be beneficial to
all. It may be, as Armen Alchian suggests, that education does not
make much difference in the trend toward socialism so long as the in-
centives for transfer legislation remain intact.2 4' On the other hand,
such a view may be overly pessimistic, and a strategy along the lines
suggested by Michael Novak2 42 might well herald a reversal of the drift
toward the omnipotent state.
At present, the preservation movement is disinclined to repudiate the
state. In spite of the newly operative private revolving funds and the
new preservation restriction statutes, most indications point toward a
preponderant politicization. A recent front-page, new-class manifesto
of political entrepreneurship for preservationists 24 3 reveals a new, ag-
gressive interest in the transfer of wealth so typical of the new class and
political coalitions. This lack of restraint is the central political prob-
240. Western Land Menaced by Desert, Chapel Hill Newspaper, July 29, 1979; See also,
Recolonizing the West, Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1979, at 24, col. I.
241. Alchian, Economic Laws and Political Legislation, in THE INTERACTION OF ECONOMICS
AND THE LAW 142-44 (B. Siegan ed. 1977).
242. M. NOVAK, supra note 207, at 37-60.
243. The Battlefor the Budget, Preservation News, May 1980, at 1, col. 1.
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lem of our time that has so degraded public discourse and the very
nature of law itself. It is tragic that the transfer mentality has spread to
the preservationists who make so much of their lofty ideals of preserv-
ing what is best in American society.
Given this misdirection of the preservation movement, prescriptions
for beneficial change come easily. As to methodology, the preservation
movement must repudiate the state and embrace the private law as the
means to achieving its goals. It must eschew the use of politics and
must pay the full cost of its preferences without any subsidies. Self-
restraint must be the norm, and the rewards for political entrepreneur-
ship must be ended. In short, there must be a complete and total rever-
sal of the direction of the preservation movement.
The preservation movement must reaffirm its commitment to the sur-
vival of democratic capitalism and must recognize the endemic self-
interest and statist influence of its new-class members. It must also pre-
serve more than just the built environment. The freedom of the indi-
vidual must be preserved along with Paca House and Pulaski Square.
The market system and the common law at its best must be preserved
along with the Battery and Beacon Hill. Only when these commit-
ments are met will the preservation movement be worthy of its name.
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Appendix of State and Territorial Historic Preservation
Statutes and Session Laws*
Alabama
Archaeology: ALA. CODE tit. 41, §§ 41-3-1 to -6 (1975).
Archives and Historical Commissions: ALA. CODE tit. 41, §§ 41-6-1 to
-15, -9-220 to -221, -9-240 to -250, -9-270 to -330, -9-510 to -513,
-9-530 to -532 (1975 & Supp. 1979).
Attorney-General Opinions: Since 1964 there have been approxi-
mately thirty opinions generally discussing the day-to-day activi-
ties of preservation agencies. Two opinions concern tax
consequences of gifts for preservation purposes. 129 Op. Att'y
Gen. 51 (1967); 138 Op. Att'y Gen. 7 (1970).
Historic Districts: Historic district legislation in Alabama is organized
by city. Formerly, what was in actuality local legislation was codi-
fied in a statutory appendix. With the publication of the new stat-
utes, reference must be made to the original session laws. No. 100,
§ 1, 1967 Ala. Acts 127; No. 140, § 1, 1971 Ala. Acts 220, as
amended, No. 581, § 1, 1973 Ala. Acts 837; No. 421, § 1, 1971 Ala.
Acts 1153, as amended, No. 66, § 1, 1978 Ala. Acts 1751; No. 1307,
§ 1, 1971 Ala. Acts 2251; No. 2271, § 1, 1971 Ala. Acts 3659, as
amended, No. 121, § 1, 1972 Ala. Acts 4360; No. 155, § 1, 1973
Ala. Acts 192; No. 207, § 1, 1973 Ala. Acts 241; No. 685, § 1, 1973
Ala. Acts 1030.
Historic Preservation: ALA. CODE tit. 41, §§ 41-10-135 to -151 (Supp.
1979). See also Archives and Historical Commissions.
Principal State Agency: ALA. CODE tit. 41, §§ 41-9-240 to -250 (1975 &
Supp. 1979).
Public Financial Assistance: ALA. CODE tit. 41, § 41-9-255 (1975); id.
§§ 41-10-142 to -146 (Supp. 1979).
State Parks and Historic Sites: ALA. CODE tit. 9, §§ 9-14-1 to -6 (1975).
Taxation: ALA. CODE tit. 41, § 41-10-147 (Supp. 1979); ALA. CONST.
art. XI, § 217 (as amended by Amendment No. 373, declared rati-
fied Nov. 20, 1978).
Tort Liability: ALA. CODE tit. 35, §§ 35-15-1 to -5 (1975).
* The format of this appendix is similar to one I used in 4 Guide to State Programs
published in 1976 by the Preservation Press of the National Trust for Historic Preservation. This
appendix, however, does not summarize legislation as does the 1976 Guide.
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Alaska
Archaeology: ALASKA STAT. § 44.37.040 (1976).
Archives and Historical Commissions: ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.19.461 -
.496 (1976).
Historic Districts: ALASKA STAT. § 29.33.090 (1972 & Supp. 1979); id.
§§ 29.48.108-.110 (Supp. 1979); id. § 41.35.180(5) (1977); id.
§§ 45.98.010-.070 (Supp. 1979).
Historic Preservation: ALASKA STAT. §§ 41.35.010-.240 (1977).
Historic Trails: See State Parks and Historic Sites.
Principal State Agency: ALASKA STAT. §§ 41.35.110-. 190 (1977).
Public Financial Assistance: ALASKA STAT. § 41.22.010 (1977); id.
§ 41.35.040; id. §§ 45.98.010-.070 (Supp. 1979).
Review of Projects: ALASKA STAT. § 41.35.070 (1977).
State Parks and Historic Sites: ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 7; ALASKA
STAT. §§ 41.20.010-.345 (1977); id. §§ 41.22.010-.030.
Taxation: ALASKA STAT. § 29.53.025(b)(2)(C), (e) (Supp. 1979).
American Samoa
Archaeology: See Archives and Historical Commissions.
Archives and Historical Commissions: A.S. CODE tit. 3, §§ 401-407
(1973); id. tit. 25, §§ 1-406 (1973).
Crimes: A.S. CODE tit. 1.5, § 1081 (1973).
Environmental Quality: A.S. CODE tit. 29, §§ 1217-1218 (1973).
State Parks and Historic Sites: A.S. CODE tit. 32, §§ 1-202 (1973).
Arizona
Archaeology: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-841 to -846 (1974 & Supp.
1979-1980).
Archives and Historical Commissions: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-
821 to -825, -831 to -834 (1974); id. §§ 41-1331 to -1352 (Supp.
1979-1980).
Attorney-General Opinions: Op. Att'y Gen. 74-13. Entry onto state
school trust lands for archaeological exploration is controlled by
director of Arizona state museum.
Crimes: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-707(2), -3702(A), (C),
-3703(A)(1), (D) (1978). See also Archaeology.
Historic and Scenic Roads: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-512 to -517
(Supp. 1979-1980).
Historic Districts: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-462.01(A)(10) (1977).
Principal State Agency: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-511.02-.04
(Supp. 1979-1980).
State Parks and Historic Sites: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-511 to
-511.20 (1974 & Supp. 1979-1980).
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Taxation: ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-139.01-.03 (Supp. Pamph.
1979).
Arkansas
Archaeology: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-801 to -808 (1976); id. §§ 9-1001
to -1017 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
Archives and Historical Commissions: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-201 to
-208 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
Crimes: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§41-113(2)(a), -901(2)(a), -1101(2)(a),
-2916, -2917 (1977). See also Archaeology.
Environmental Quality: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-1401 to -1416 (1976 &
Supp. 1979).
Historic Districts: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-5001 to -5011 (1980).
Historic Preservation: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-654 to -654.3 (1979).
See also Principal State Agency.
Historic Trails: See State Parks and Historic Sites.
Preservation Restrictions: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-1201 to -1206
(Supp. 1979).
Principal State Agency: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-904 to -913 (Supp.
1979).
Review of Projects: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-1006 (1976).
State Parks and Historic Sites: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-101 to -606
(1976); id. §§ 9-601 to -647 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
State Register of Historic Places: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-910 to -911
(Supp. 1979).
Tort Liability: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-1101 to -1107 (1971).
California
Archaeology: CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 5097-5097.97 (West 1972 &
Supp. 1980).
Archives and Historical Commissions: CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12220-
12232 (West 1963 & Supp. 1980); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 5120-
5132 (West 1972).
Building Codes: CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 18950-18960 (West
Supp. 1980).
Crimes: CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 622-622/2 (West 1970); id. § 623 (West
Supp. 1980). See also Archaeology.
Environmental Quality: CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 5093.30-.40 (West
Supp. 1980); id. §§5093.50-.65, 21000-21174; id. §§6370-6378
(West 1977 & Supp. 1980).
Historic Districts: CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 50280-50290 (West Supp.
1980); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 5031-5033 (West Supp. 1980).
Historic Landmarks: CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 25373, 37361 (West 1968).
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Historic Preservation: CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65303 (West Supp. 1980).
Historic Trails: CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 5050-5076 (West Supp. 1980).
See also State Park and Historic Sites.
Principal State Agency: CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 5020-5020.4 (West
Supp. 1980).
State Parks and Historic Sites: CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 5001-5019.5
(West 1972 & Supp. 1980); id. §§ 5020-5025.2; id. §§ 5096.1-.101;
id. §§ 5040-5043 (West 1972); id. §§ 5093.50-.65 (West Supp.
1980); id. §§ 6370-6378 (West 1977).
State Register of Historic Places: CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 5020.4, 5021
(West Supp. 1980).
Taxation: CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 421-430.5 (West 1970 & Supp.
1980); id. §§ 439-439.4 (West Supp. 1980); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§§ 5031-5033 (West Supp. 1980); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 50280-
50290 (West Supp. 1980).
Tort Liability: CAL. CIV. CODE § 846 (West Supp. 1980).
Colorado
Archaeology: COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-80-401 to -410 (1973).
Archives and Historical Commissions: COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-80-101
to -112 (1973 & Supp. 1979); id. §§ -201 to -213 (1973); id. §§ -301
to -307.
Attorney-General Opinions: Op. Att'y Gen. (Dec. 27, 1974).
Crimes: COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-501 (1973); id. § 24-80-801 (1973).
See also Archaeology and Historic Districts.
Environmental Quality: COLO. REV. STAT. §§24-65.1-101 to -502
(Supp. 1979); id. §§ 29-20-101 to -107; id. § -21-101 (1977 & Supp.
1979).
Historic Districts: COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-80-1201 to -1202 (1973).
Historic Preservation: COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-80. 1-101 to- 108 (Supp.
1979).
Historic Trails: COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 33-42-101 to -112 (1973 & Supp.
1979).
Preservation Restrictions: COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 31-25-201, -301 (1977);
id. §§ 38-30.5-101 to -110 (Supp. 1979).
Principal State Agency: COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-80-201 to -213 (1973).
Public Financial Assistance: COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-49-101 to -118
(Supp. 1979).
Review of Projects: COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-65.1-101 to -502 (Supp.
1979).
State Parks and Historic Sites: COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-80-501 to -502
(1973).
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State Register of Historic Places: COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-80.1-101 to
-108 (Supp. 1979).
Taxation: COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-1-104(5), -5-105 (Supp. 1979); No.
572, § 1, 1977 Colo. Sess. Laws 1541.
Tort Liability: COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 33-41-101 to -106 (1973 & Supp.
1979).
Connecticut
Archives and Historical Commissions: See Principal State Agency.
Building Codes: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-395t, -403(c), (g)
(West Supp. 1980).
Crimes: See Historic Districts.
Environmental Quality: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-131a to -13 In
(West 1972 & Supp. 1980); id. §§ 22a-1 to -45 (West 1975 & Supp.
1980).
Historic Districts: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-147a to -147/ (West
1972 & Supp. 1980).
Historic Trails: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-66 to -72 (West 1975 &
Supp. 1980).
Preservation Restrictions: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-42a to -42c
(West 1978).
Principal State Agency: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-321 to -321g
(West 1977 & Supp. 1980).
Public Financial Assistance: No. 77-47, § 8, 1977 Conn. Spec. Acts 54.
Quasi-Public Nonprofit Organization: Spec. Act 75-93, § 1, 1975 Conn.
Pub. Acts 94.
Review of Projects: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-321(b)(13) (West
1977 & Supp. 1980).
State Parks and Historic Sites: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-133 to
-135 (West 1960 & Supp. 1980); id. § 13a-252 (West Supp. 1980);
id. §§ 23-4 to -27 (West 1975 & Supp. 1980); id. § 47-18 (West
1960).
State Register of Historic Places: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-
321(b)(2) (West 1977 & Supp. 1980).
Taxation: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-81(7) (West Supp. 1980); id.
§§ 12-127a, -347 (West 1972); id. § 7-131b.
Tort Liability: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-557f to -557i (West
Supp. 1980). See also Historic Trails.
Delaware
Archaeology: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 5301-5306, 5401 (1974).
Archives and Historical Commissions: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §§ 401-
423, 501-536, 571-574 (1974 & Supp. 1978).
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Civil Liability: See Archaeology and State Parks and Historic Sites.
Crimes: See Archaeology and State Parks and Historic Sites.
Principal State Agency: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §§ 551-574 (1974).
Public Financial Assistance: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 554 (1974).
State Parks and Historic Sites: See Principal State Agency.
Tort Liability: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 5901-5907 (1974).
District of Columbia
Historic Districts: D.C. CODE ENCYCL. §§ 5-801 to -805 (West 1966);
Historic Landmark and Historic District Protection Act of 1978
(Bill 2-367, adopted Nov. 28, 1978).
Historic Landmarks: D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 5-410 (West 1966); His-
toric Landmark and Historic District Protection Act of 1978 (Bill
2-367, adopted Nov. 28, 1978).
State Parks and Historic Sites: D.C. CODE ENCYCL. §§ 1-1001 to -1013,
8-103 to -171 (West 1966 & Supp. 1970 & Supp. 1978-1979); id.
§ 5-410 (West 1966); id. §§ 9-101 to -501 (West 1966 & Supp. 1978-
1979).
Taxation: D.C. CODE ENCYCL. §§ 47-651 to -654 (West Supp. 1978-
1979); id. §§ 47-801a to -837 (West 1968 & Supp. 1970 & Supp.
1978-1979).
Florida
Archaeology: FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 267.11-.14 (West 1975). See also
Environmental Quality and State Parks and Historic Sites.
Archives and Historical Commissions: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 267.051
(West 1975).
Attorney-General Opinions: Op. Att'y Gen. 069-43 (June 26, 1969).
Authority of Florida Board of Parks and Historic Memorials over
state park not subject to county zoning laws.
Crimes: See Archaeology.
Environmental Quality: FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 380.012-.25 (West 1975 &
Supp. 1979).
Historic Districts: FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 266.01-.07 (West 1975) (St. Au-
gustine); id. §§ 266.101-.108 (Pensacola); id. §§ 266.110-.117 (Tal-
lahassee); id. §§ 266.201-.208 (West 1975 & Supp. 1979) (Key
West); id. §§ 266.301-.308 (Boca Raton); id. §§ 266.401-.410 (West
Supp. 1979) (Tampa); id. §§ 267.0615-.0616; Ch. 73-408, § 1, 1973
Fla. Laws 46 (Bradford County).
Preservation Restrictions: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 704.06 (West 1979).
Principal State Agency: FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 267.061-.0616 (West 1975
& Supp. 1979).
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Public Financial Assistance: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 267.0617 (West Supp.
1979).
State Parks and Historic Sites: FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 275.011-.315 (West
1974 & Supp. 1979).
Tort Liability: FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 375.251 (West 1975 & Supp. 1979).
Georgia
Archaeology: GA. CODE ANN. §§ 40-813a to -814a (1975); id. §§ 43-
2501 to -2508 (1978).
Archives and Historical Commissions: GA. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2601 to -
2606 (1971); id. §§ 40-801 to -812, -801a to -812a (1975 & Supp.
1979).
Attorney-General Opinions: Op. Att'y Gen. 71-139 tax exemption of
preservation organization; 76-50 not essential that land subject to
conservation easement be within historic district; 79-14 expenses
authorized for members and employees of Historic Chattahoochee
Commission.
Crimes: GA. CODE ANN. 40-9910 (1975); id. §§ 43-9915, -9916 (1978).
Environmental Quality: GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-901 to -905 (1971 &
Supp. 1979); id. §§ 43-1201 to -1207 (1978); id. §§ -2601 to -2607
(Supp. 1979).
Historic Districts: No. 196, § 1, 1968 Ga. Laws 1591 (Savannah); No.
268, § 1, 1968 Ga. Laws 1826, as amended, No. 241, § 1, 1972 Ga.
Laws 1515 (Atlanta); No. 206, § 1, 1970 Ga. Laws 1078 (Augusta).
Historic Preservation: GA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-120 to -138 (1978); id.
§§ 43-2301 to -2308. See also Archives and Historical Commis-
sions.
Historic Trails: GA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-1501 to -1507 (1978).
Preservation Restrictions: GA. CODE ANN. §§ 85-1406 to -1410 (1978
& Supp. 1979).
Principal State Agency: GA. CODE ANN. §§ 40-801a to -814a (1975 &
Supp. 1979).
State Parks and Historic Sites: See Historic Preservation.
Taxation: GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1409 (1978).
Tort Liability: GA. CODE ANN. §§ 105-403 to -409 (1968).
Guam
Archaeology: GUAM GOV'T CODE §§ 13985.11, .15-.28, .29-.35 (Supp.
1974).
Archives and Historical Commissions: GUAM GOV'T CODE
§§ 13985.36-.40 (Supp. 1974).
Crimes: GUAM GOV'T CODE §§ 13985.25, .27, .28, .35 (Supp. 1974);
GUAM PENAL CODE § 622a (1970).
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Environmental Quality: GUAM GOV'T CODE §§ 26300-26306 (Supp.
1974).
Historic Preservation: See Principal State Agency.
Principal State Agency: GUAM GOV'T CODE §§ 13985-13985.14 (Supp.
1974).
Public Financial Assistance: GUAM GOV'T CODE § 13985.2(5) (Supp.
1974).
Review of Projects: GUAM GOV'T CODE §§ 13985.11, .23, .41 (Supp.
1974).
State Register of Historic Places: GUAM GOV'T CODE § 13985.2(2)
(Supp. 1974).
Hawaii
Archaeology: HAWAII REV. STAT. § 6E-7 (1976).
Attorney General Opinions: Op. Att'y Gen. (Oct. 26, 1979). Properties
placed on Hawaii Register of Historic Places without notification
to property owner have not been validly registered and should be
removed prior to possible resubmission of application that meets
due process requirements.
Building Codes: HAWAII REV. STAT. § 6E-15 (1976).
Crimes: HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 6E- 11 to -12 (1976).
Environmental Quality: HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 201-30(6), 344-1 to -4
(1976).
Historic Districts: HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 46-4.5, 246-34 (1976).
Historic Preservation: HAWAII CONST. art. VIII, § 5; HAWAII REV.
STAT. §§ 6-16 to -16.9 (1976 & Supp. 1979); id. §§ 58-1 to -5. See
also Principal State Agency.
Preservation Restrictions: HAWAII REV. STAT. § 6E-15 (1976).
Principal State Agency: HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 6E-1 to -39 (1976).
Review of Projects: HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 6E-8 to -10 (1976).
State Register of Historic Places: HAWAII REV. STAT. § 6E-3(4) (1976).
Taxation: HAWAII REV. STAT. § 246-34 (1976).
Idaho
Archaeology: IDAHO CODE §§ 67-4118 to -4122 (1973).
Archives and Historical Commissions: IDAHO CODE §§ 67-4123 to
-4130 (1973 & Supp. 1979); id. § 31-864 (Supp. 1979).
Building Codes: IDAHO CODE § 67-4618 (Supp. 1979).
Civil Liability: IDAHO CODE § 67-4118 (1973).
Crimes: IDAHO CODE § 18-7021 (1979); id. §§ 67-4118, -4122 (1973).
See also State Parks and Historic Sites.
Historic Districts: IDAHO CODE §§ 67-4607 to -4612 (Supp. 1979).
Historic Landmarks: IDAHO CODE §§ 67-4614 to -4616 (Supp. 1979).
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Historic Preservation: IDAHO CODE §§ 67-4601 to -4619 (Supp. 1979).
Historic Trails: See State Parks and Historic Sites.
Preservation Restrictions: IDAHO CODE § 67-4612 to -4613 (Supp.
1979).
Principal State Agency: IDAHO CODE §§ 67-4123 to -4130 (1973 &
Supp. 1979).
Public Financial Assistance: IDAHO CODE § 31-864 (Supp. 1979).
State Parks and Historic Sites: IDAHO CODE §§ 67-4113 to -4118 (1973
& Supp. 1979); id. §§ 67-4201 to -4236, -4301 to -4312.
Tort Liability: IDAHO CODE § 36-1604 (1977).
Illinois
Archaeology: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 133C1-133C6 (Smith-Hurd
1967 & Supp. 1979).
Archives and Historical Commissions: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24 §§ 11-
47-1 to -2, -48-1 to -3 (Smith-Hurd 1962); id. ch. 34, § 412 (Smith-
Hurd 1960); id. § 2481 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); id. ch. 81, §§ 70-
71 (Smith-Hurd 1966); id. ch. 116, §§ 43.4-47.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1979); id. ch. 128, §§ 13-17 (Smith-Hurd 1953 & Supp. 1979); id.
§§ 18-20 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
Civil Liability: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 133d12 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1979).
Crimes: See Archaeology.
Historic Districts: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 11-48.2-1 to -7 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1979), as amended, R.A. 81-560, 1979 Ill. Legis. Serv.
1273 (West).
Historic Landmarks: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-48.2-2, -5 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1979), as amended, P.A. 81-560, 1979 Ill. Legis. Serv.
1273 (West).
Preservation Restrictions: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 11-48.2-1A(2),
(5), -2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); id. ch. 30, §§ 401-406.
Principal State Agency: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 133dl-133d14
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
Review of Projects: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 133d8-133d9 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1979).
State Parks and Historic Sites: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 19, §§ 37.11-.24
(Smith-Hurd 1972 & Supp. 1979); id. ch. 34, § 303 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1979); id. ch. 57 , §§ 101-121 (Smith-Hurd 1972 & Supp.
1979); id. ch. 105, § 325a (Smith-Hurd 1952); id. §§ 465-551
(Smith-Hurd 1952 & Supp. 1979); id. ch. 127, §§ 200-21 to -34
(Smith-Hurd 1967 & Supp. 1979); id. ch. 128, §§ 31-33 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1979).
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State Register of Historic Places: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 133d6
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
Taxation: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-48.2-6 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1979).
Tort Liability: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 31-37 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1979).
Indiana
Archaeology: IND. CODE ANN. §§ 14-3-3.3-4 to -5 (Burns Supp. 1979).
Archives and Historical Commissions: IND. CODE ANN. §§ 17-3-86-1
to -11 (Burns 1974).
Crimes: IND. CODE ANN. §§ 14-3-3.3-9, 18-4-22-10.1 (Burns Supp.
1979).
Historic Districts: IND. CODE ANN. §§ 18-4-22-1 to -12 (Burns Supp.
1979); id. §§ -24-1 to -25 (Burns 1974); id. §§ -7-22-1 to -11 (Burns
Supp. 1979).
Historic Preservation: IND. CODE ANN. §§ 14-3-3.3-1 to -14 (Burns
Supp. 1979); id. § 17-1-14-11(l)(B).
Preservation Restrictions: IND. CODE ANN. § 14-3-3.3-12 (Burns Supp.
1979).
Principal State Agency: See Historic Preservation.
Review of Projects: IND. CODE ANN. §§ 14-3-3.3-5, -11 (Burns Supp.
1979).
State Parks and Historic Sites: IND. CODE ANN. §§ 14-6-1-1 to -28-4
(Burns 1973 & Supp. 1979); id. §§ 17-2-55-1 to -3 (Burns 1974); id.
§§ 18-5-15-1, -7-5-99.
State Register of Historic Places: IND. CODE ANN. §§ 14-3-3.3-6(b), -10
(Burns Supp. 1979).
Tort Liability: IND. CODE ANN. § 14-2-6-3 (Burns 1973).
Iowa
Archaeology: IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 305A. 1-.9 (West Supp. 1979-1980).
Archives and Historical Commissions: IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 303.1-. 15
(West Supp. 1979-1980); id. §§ 304.1-.17; id. § 358B.17 (West
1977).
Attorney-General Opinions: Op. Att'y Gen. (Glenn) (Nov. 19, 1976)
municipality must establish historic districts under IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 303.20-.33 and not through general zoning power for aes-
thetic purposes; (Spencer) (Apr. 26, 1977) discussion of landowner
liability for injuries under IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 11 1C.1-.7.
Environmental Quality: IowA CODE ANN. §§ 27A. 1-.6 (West 1978); id.
§§ 108A.1-.7 (West Supp. 1979-1980); id. §§ 1l1A.l-.10; id.
§§ lllB.l-13; id. §§ lllD.1-.5.
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Historic Districts: IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 303.20-.33 (West Supp. 1979-
1980).
Principal State Agency: IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 303.1-.15 (West Supp.
1979-1980).
Review of Projects: IOWA CODE ANN. § 305A.5 (West Supp. 1979-
1980).
State Parks and Historic Sites: IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 111.1-.49 (West
1949 & Supp. 1979-1980).
State Register of Historic Places: IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 303.5(9), .8(3)
(West Supp. 1979-1980).
Tort Liability: IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 11 1C.1-.7 (West Supp. 1979-1980).
Kansas
Archaeology: KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-5401 to -5408 (1972 & Supp.
1979).
Archives and Historical Commissions: KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-2701 to
-2714 (1977 & Supp. 1979).
Attorney-General Opinions: VI Op. Att'y Gen. 692 (Apr. 16, 1969) ex-
emption from taxation of building used for historical purposes; Op
Att'y Gen. (Dec. 11, 1979) enactment of, or amendment to, a mu-
nicipal zoning ordinance is not a "project" within the meaning of
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2724 requiring opportunity for historic
preservation officer to comment.
Crimes: See Archaeology.
Historic Preservation: KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-2715 to -2725 (1977).
Principal State Agency: See Historic Preservation.
Review of Projects: KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-2724 to -2725 (1977).
State Parks and Historic Sites: KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-1927 to -1928a
(1974); id. §§ 76-2001 to -2048 (1977 & Supp. 1979).
State Register of Historic Places: KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-2720(b),(d),
-2721(b) (1977).
Tort Liability: KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-3201 to -3207 (1976).
Kentucky
Archaeology: Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 164.705-.735 (1980).
Archives and Historical Commissions: Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 171.311-
.340, .385-.395, .410-.990 (1980). See also Principal State Agency.
Attorney General Opinions: Op. Att'y Gen. 72-537, 75-80, 75-328, 76-
178, 78-10. Discussions of the implementation and enforcement of
the Kentucky archaeology statute.
Crimes: See Archaeology.
Environmental Quality: Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 146.200-.990 (1980).
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Historic Districts: Ky. REV. STAT. § 100.127(3), .203(1)(e) (Supp.
1978); id. § 100.201 (1971).
Historic Trails: See State Parks and Historic Sites.
Principal State Agency: Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 171.381-.384 (1980).
State Parks and Historic Sites: Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 148.001-.991 (1980).
State Register of Historic Places: Ky. REV. STAT. § 171.381(4)(d)
(1980).
Tort Liability: Ky. REV. STAT. § 150.645 (1980).
Louisiana
Archaeology: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41:1601 to :1613 (West Supp.
1980).
Archives and Historical Commissions: LA. CONST. art. IV § 7; LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:1541 to :1543 (West 1963); id. §§ 44:404 to
:430 (West Supp. 1980).
Attorney-General Opinions: Op. Att'y Gen. (Dec. 21, 1966). Discus-
sion of the effect of federal preservation statutes.
Crimes: See Archaeology and Historic Districts.
Environmental Quality: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:1841 to :1849
(West Supp. 1980).
Historic Districts: LA. CONST. art. XII, § 4; id. art. VI, § 17; LA.
CONST. of 1921, art. 14, § 22A; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25:731 to
:767 (West 1975 & Supp. 1980); id. §§ 33:4571 to :4573 (West
Supp. 1980).
Historic Landmarks: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25:751 to :767 (West
1975 & Supp. 1980).
Historic Preservation: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25:801 to :812 (West
1975 & Supp. 1980); id. § 36:209(H)(I) (West Spec. Pamph. 1980).
Preservation Restrictions: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1252 (West Supp.
1980).
Principal State Agency: See Historic Preservation.
State Parks and Historic Sites: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48:271 (West
Supp. 1980); id. §§ 56:1681.1 to 1732 (West 1952 & Supp. 1980).
Taxation: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:305.14 (West Supp. 1980).
Tort Liability: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2795 (West Supp. 1980).
Maine
Archaeology: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4720 (Supp. Pamph.
1965-1979); id. tit. 27, §§ 361, 371-374 (1974).
Archives and Historical Commissions: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§
91-97 (1979); id. tit. 27, §§ 81-89 (1974); id. §§ 261-267 (1974 &
Supp. 1979-1980).
Attorney-General Opinions: Op. Att'y Gen. (June 23, 1967) title to
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shipwrecks within three-mile territorial limit; (Jan. 11, 1971) juris-
diction of state park agency in preservation matters.
Crimes: See Archives and Historical Commissions; State Parks and
Historic Sites.
Environmental Quality: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 3310-3314
(1979); id. tit. 12, §§ 681-689 (1974 & Supp. 1979-1980).
Historic Preservation: See Principal State Agency.
Historic Trails: See State Parks and Historic Sites.
Principal State Agency: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 501-510 (1974
& Supp. 1979-1980).
Public Financial Assistance: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, § 543
(Supp. Pamph. 1979).
Review of Projects: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 374 (1974).
State Parks and Historic Sites: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 601-608
(1974 & Supp. Pamph. 1974-1979); id. tit. 33, § 1357 (Supp. 1979-
1980).
State Register of Historic Places: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 504(3)
(1974).
Tort Liability: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3001-3005 (1974); id.
tit. 14, § 8103(2)(F)(2) (1980).
Maryland
Archaeology: MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 2-301 to -310 (1974 &
Supp. 1979).
Archives and Historical Commissions: MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 360
(1968); id. §§ 365-374A (1978 & Supp. 1979).
Attorney-General Opinions: Op. ATT'y GEN. (Jan. 18, 1973) local
preservation law not binding on state agencies; (Mar. 3, 1975) state
enabling law for historic zoning not applicable to chartered coun-
ties; (June 20, 1975) funding of utility lines in historic districts;
(Sept. 6, 1977) standards for deletion of property from historic dis-
trict; (Oct. 28, 1977) constitutionality of state funding for historic
religious properties.
Environmental Quality: MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 3-201 to -206
(1974 & Supp. 1979); id. §§ 8-401 to -410 (Supp. 1979).
Historic Districts: MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A, § 5(BB) (Supp. 1979); id.
art. 66B, §§ 2.12, 8.01-.15 (1978); id. art. 66D, § 8-101(c).
Historic Trails: MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 5-1001 (1974).
Preservation Restrictions: MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 8.04 (1978); id.
art. 78A, § 14C (1975); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 2-118 (1974
& Supp. 1979).
Principal State Agency: MD. ANN. CODE. art. 41, §§ 181A-181KA
(1978 & Supp. 1979).
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Public Financial Assistance: MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 181-1-1 (1978).
State Parks and Historic Sites: MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§ 407-408
(1978); id. art. 78A, §§ 14A-14B (1975 & Supp. 1979).
State Register of Historic Places: MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 181KA
(1978).
Taxation: MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 9(h) (1975); id. § 12E (1975 &
Supp. 1979); id. §§ 12G, 281A (Supp. 1979).
Tort Liability: MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 5-1101 to -1108 (1974).
Massachusetts
Archaeology: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6, §§ 179-180 (West 1976).
Archives and Historical Commissions: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 9,
§ 2A (West 1976); id. §§ 26-28 (West 1976 & Supp. 1979); id. ch.
36, § 14A, ch. 40, § 8D, ch. 79, § 5A, ch. 81, § 13B, ch. 180, § 4(b)
(West Supp. 1979).
Attorney-General Opinions: Op. ATT'Y GEN. 100 (Apr. 7, 1967). Pow-
ers of Massachusetts Historic Commission to administer funds
from federal government.
Building Codes: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 143, § 3A (West Supp.
1979); Ch. 144, § 1, 1975 Mass. Acts 108.
Crimes: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 95 (West Supp. 1979).
Environmental Quality: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, § 1 D (West
1976); id. ch. 21A, §§ 1-14 (West Supp. 1979).
Historic Districts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40C, §§ 1-17 (West
1979) (general authorization for local historic districts). Ch. 616,
§ 1, 1955 Mass. Acts 513, as amended, Ch. 314, § 1, 1958 Mass.
Acts 170, Ch. 315, § 1, 1958 Mass. Acts 171, as amended, Ch. 622,
§ 1, 1963 Mass. Acts 473, as amended, Ch. 429, § 1, 1965 Mass.
Acts 229 (Beacon Hill); Ch. 395, § 1, 1970 Mass. Acts 237, as
amended, Ch. 708, § 1, 1972 Mass. Acts 605 (Nantucket); Ch. 447,
§ 1, 1956 Mass. Acts 295, as amended, Ch. 185, § 1, 1958 Mass.
Acts 92, as amended, Ch. 579, § 1, 1966 Mass. Acts 531 (Lexing-
ton); Ch. 345, § 1, 1960 Mass. Acts 237 (Concord); Ch. 40, § 1,
1963 Mass. Acts 20 (Sudbury); Ch. 118, § 1, 1964 Mass. Acts 64
(Bedford); Ch. 48, § 1, 1965 Mass. Acts 20 (Chatham); Ch. 101,
§ 1, 1965 Mass. Acts 57 (Marblehead); Ch. 694, § 1, 1965 Mass.
Acts 474 (Yarmouth); Ch. 211, § 1, 1966 Mass. Acts 159 (Peter-
sham); Ch. 502, § 1, 1966 Mass. Acts 464 (Hingham); Ch. 654, § 1,
1975 Mass. Acts 693 (Falmouth).
Historic Preservation: MASS. CONST. arts. XLIX, LI.
Historic Trails: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 132, §§ 38-39 (West 1974
& Supp. 1979).
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Preservation Restrictions: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, §§ 31-33
(West 1977 & Supp. 1979).
Principal State Agency: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 9, §§ 26-28 (West
1976 & Supp. 1979).
Review of Projects: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 121B, § 48 (West
Supp. 1979).
State Parks and Historic Sites: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 8, §§ 1-21
(West 1976 & Supp. 1979); id. ch. 40, § 5(13) (West 1958); id. ch.
81 § 7M (West Supp. 1979); id. ch. 132A, §§ 1-18 (West 1974 &
Supp. 1979).
Tort Liability: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21, § 17C (West 1973).
Michigan
Archaeology: MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 299.51-.55 (1967).
Archives and Historical Commissions: MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 399.1-.61, 399.161-.172 (1976 & Supp. 1979); id. § 450.163-.167
(1973 & Supp. 1979).
Attorney-General Opinions: Op. ATT'Y GEN. (Mar. 6, 1975).
Crimes: See Archaeology and State Parks and Historic Sites.
Environmental Quality: MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 281.761-.776
(1979); id. §§ 554.701-.719 (Supp. 1979).
Historic Districts: MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 399.201-.212, 125.1679
(1976) (downtown development authority).
Historic Trials: See State Parks and Historic Sites.
Principal State Agency: MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 399.1-.61, .151-
.152 (1976 & Supp. 1979); id. §§ .111-.113 (Supp. 1979).
State Parks and Historic Sites: MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 318.3-.409
(1967 & Supp. 1979).
Tort Liability: MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 300.201 (Supp. 1979).
Minnesota
Archaeology: MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 138.31-.42 (West 1979).
Archives and Historical Commissions: MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 138.161-
.25 (West 1979); id. §§ 190.095, 416.05 (West Supp. 1980); id.
§ 471.93 (West 1977).
Attorney-General Opinions: Op. ATT'Y GEN. 477b-3 (May 25, 1967)
discusses types of legislation appropriate for accomplishing preser-
vation goals; Op. ATT'Y GEN. 59a-35 (Apr. 18, 1978) discusses uses
of funds under MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.193.
Crimes: See Archaeology.
Environmental Quality: MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116B.01-.13, 116C.01-
.34, 116D.01-.07, 116G.01-.14 (West 1977).
Historic Districts: MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 138.71-.75 (West 1979).
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Historic Landmarks: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.193 (West 1977).
Historic Trails: MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 84.029(2) (West 1977); id.
§§ 85.015 -.017 (West 1977 & Supp. 1980); id. § 85.021, 86A.05(4),
93.45 (West 1977); id. § 160.06 (West 1960).
Principal State Agency: MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 138.01-.09, .51-.68
(West 1979 & Supp. 1980).
Public Financial Assistance: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.93 (West 1977).
Review of Projects (Environmental): MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116B.01-
.13, 116D.01-.07 (West 1977).
State Parks and Historic Sites: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.50 (West 1977
& Supp. 1980); id. §§ 138.01-.09, .51-.68.
State Register of Historic Places: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 138.53 (West
1979).
Tort Liability: MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 87.01-.03 (West 1977).
Mississippi
Archaeology: Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 39-7-1 to -39 (1973).
Archives and Historic Commissions: Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-1 to
-65 (1973 & Supp. 1979).
Crimes: MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-7-9 (1973).
Historic Districts: MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-1 to -9 (Supp. 1979).
Historic Landmarks: Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-1 to -5 (Supp. 1979).
Principal State Agency: Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-1 to -65 (1973 &
Supp. 1979).
State Parks and Historic Sites: Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 29-5-1 to -97, 55-
3-1 to -105 (1973 & Supp. 1979); id. § 55-15-43 (Supp. 1979).
Taxation: Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 27-11-5, -43(l)(f), -31-1(d) (Supp.
1979).
Missouri
Archaeology: See Environmental Quality.
Archives and Historical Commissions: Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 183.010-
.030, 184.010-.388 (Vernon 1965 & Supp. 1980); id. § 352.040
(Vernon 1966).
Crimes: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 577.073(3) (Vernon 1979).
Environmental Quality: Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 67.870-.910 (Vernon
Supp. 1980).
Historic Districts: Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 89.020-.040 (Vernon 1971).
Historic Preservation: Mo. CONST. art. 3, § 48.
Principal State Agency: Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 253.010-.375 (Vernon
1963 & Supp. 1980).
State Parks and Historic Sites: Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 8.020,. 100 (Vernon
1969); id. §§ 253.010-.375 (Vernon 1963 & Supp. 1980).
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Montana
Archaeology: MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 22-3-432 (1979).
Archives and Historical Commissions: MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§§ 22-3-101 to -221 (1979).
Crimes: MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 22-3-442, 23-1-106(2) (1979).
Environmental Quality: MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 22-3-433 (1979).
Historic Preservation: MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 4.
Preservation Restrictions: MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 76-6-101 to
-211 (1979).
Principal State Agency: MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 2-15-1512, 22-3-
101 to -112, -3-421 to -442, 90-1-102 (1979).
Review of Projects: MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 22-3-433 to -435
(1979).
State Parks and Historic Sites: MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 23-1-101
to -202 (1979).
Tort Liability: MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 70-16-301 to -302 (1979).
Nebraska
Archaeology: NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-1363 (1974).
Archives and Historical Commissions: NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 14-102(27),
15-210, 16-251 (1977); id. §§ 51-501 to -513 (1974), as amended,
L.B.187, § 180, 1979 Neb. Laws 667-68; id. §§ 72-720 to -730
(1976); id. §§ 82-101 to -130 (1976); id. § 84-1214.01 (1976).
Historic Districts: NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 19-901 to -915, 23-114.03(14)
(1977).
Principal State Agency: NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 82-101 to -130 (1976).
Public Financial Assistance: NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 23-351 to -355.01
(1977), as amended, L.B. 187, § 115, 1979 Neb. Laws 622.
State Parks and Historic Sites: NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 23-351 to -355.01
(1977), as amended, L.B. 187, § 115, 1979 Neb. Laws 622; id.
§§ 72-407 to -425 (1976).
Tort Liability: NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 37-1001 to -1008 (1974).
Nevada
Archaeology: NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 381.195-.227 (1977).
Archives and Historical Commissions: NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 86.010-.080
(1973); id. §§ 225.065-.070, 239.010-.330, 382.010-.090 (1977).
Crimes: NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 206.025, .180, .190, .320 (1973); id.
§ 407.250 (1977).
Historic Districts: NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 384.010-.210 (1977), as
amer'ded, Ch. 372, § 1, 1979 Nev. Stats. 738.
Principal State Agency: NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 383.011-.121 (1977), as
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amended, Ch. 102, § 1, 1979 Nev. Stats. 159; Ch. 179, § 1, 1979
Nev. Stats. 269.
Review of Projects: NEV. REV. STAT. § 383.121 (1977).
State Parks and Historic Sites: NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 331.130-.140
(1977); id. §§ 407.011-.217 (1977), as amended, Ch. 180, § 1, 1979
Nev. Stats. 272; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 408.950 (1977).
State Register of Historic Places: Ch. 180, § 1, 1979 Nev. Stats. 272.
Taxation: NEV. REV. STAT. § 244.377 (1977); id. §§ 361A.010-.280, as
amended, Ch. 142, § 1, 1979 Nev. Stats. 208.
Tort Liability: Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.510 (1975).
New Hampshire
Archives and Historical Commissions: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-
B:1-23 (1970 & Supp. 1979); id. § 31:4-XX (1970); id. §§ 227-A:1-5
(1977).
Environmental Quality: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 253:17-18 (1977).
Historic Districts: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:89-a to -1 (1970 &
Supp. 1979).
Historic Trails: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 216-D:1-4, 216-F: 1-5 (1977).
Preservation Restrictions: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 477:45-47 (Supp.
1979).
Principal State Agency: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 227-C:1-9 (1977).
State Parks and Historic Sites: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:8-a (Supp.
1979); id. § 31:4-XLIII (1970); id. §§ 216-A:1-6 (1977); id. §§
218:5-16 (1977 & Supp. 1979); id. §§ 227D:1-6, 243:1-6, 249:38-a to
43 (1977).
Tort Liability: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 212:34 (Supp. 1979).
New Jersey
Archaeology: See Archives and Historical Commissions.
Archives and Historical Commissions: N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:3-1, :6-2
(West 1939); id. §§ 18A:73-1 to -48 (West 1968 & Supp. 1979-
1980); id. §§ 40:33A-1 to -6 (West Supp. 1979-1980); id. §§ 40A:12-
15(g), -21(f) (West Pamphlet 1979); id. §§ 45:17A-5(b)(2) (West
1978); id. §§ 52:3-5, -7 (West 1970); id. §§ 56:2-1 to -9 (West 1964).
Environmental Quality: N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:8-45 to -63, :8A-19 to
-55 (West 1979).
Historic Trails: N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:8-29 to -44 (West 1979).
Principal State Agency: N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1B-15.100-.132 (West
1979).
Review of Projects: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1B-15.131 (West 1979).
State Parks and Historic Sites: N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1B-15.100-.132,
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:13A-1 to -15 (West 1979); id. § 27:7A-16 (West Supp. 1979-1980);
id. §§ 40:32-6, :60-25.53 (West 1967); id. § 54:40-55 (West 1960).
State Register of Historic Places: N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1B-15.128-
.132 (West 1979).
Taxation: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.3 (West 1960); id. §§ 54:4-3.6, -3.52
to .54 (West Supp. 1979-1980); id. §§ 54:32B-9(f)(3)(B)-(C).
Tort Liability: N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42A-2 to -5, :53A-7 to -9 (West
Supp. 1979-1980).
New Mexico
Archaeology: N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-6-9 to -12 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
Archives and Historical Commissions: N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-3-1 to
-8 (1978 & Supp. 1979); id. §§ 18-4-1 to -6 (1978).
Attorney-General Opinions: Op. Att'y Gen. 71-100 (Aug. 18, 1971).
Historic District Act empowers any county or municipality other-
wise empowered to adopt and enforce zoning ordinances to create
zoning districts designated as historic areas.
Crimes: See Historic Trails and Principal State Agency.
Environmental Quality: N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-13-1 to -16 (1978).
Historic Districts: N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-22-1 to -5 (1978).
Historic Trails: N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-3-1 to -9 (1978).
Principal State Agency: N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-6-1 to -17 (1978 &
Supp. 1979).
State Parks and Historic Sites: N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-2-1 to -32, 21-8-
27, 67-9-5 (1978).
State Register of Historic Places: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-5(B) (Supp.
1979).
Taxation: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-13 (1978).
Tort Liability: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 16-3-9 (1978).
New York
Archaeology: N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 233-234 (McKinney 1969); N.Y. IN-
DIAN LAW § 12-a (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980).
Archives and Historical Commissions: N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 140-150
(McKinney 1969 & Supp. 1979-1980); N.Y. EST., POWERS, &
TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.4(b)(6) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980); N.Y.
ExEc. LAW § 172-a(2)(b) (McKinney Supp. Pamph. 1972-1979);
N.Y. GEN. MUNIC. LAW §§ 72, 77-a (McKinney 1977); N.Y. NOT-
FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 1408 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1979-
1980).
Crimes: N.Y. PENAL LAW § 170.45 (McKinney 1975).
Environmental Quality: N.Y. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION LAW
§ 3-03Gl(l)(p) (McKinney 1973); id. §§ 15-2701 to -2723 (McKin-
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ney Supp. 1979-1980); id. §§ 45-0101 to -0117 (McKinney 1973 &
Supp. 1979-1980); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 721 (McKinney Supp.
Pamph. 1972-1979); N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §§ 2000-2010 (McKin-
ney 1970 & Supp. 1970-1979).
Historic Districts: N.Y. GEN. MUNIC. LAW § 96-a (McKinney 1977);
N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §§ 1900-1920 (McKinney 1970); N.Y.
TOWN LAW § 64(17-a)(McKinney Supp. 1979).
Historic Landmarks: N.Y. GEN. MUNIC. LAW § 96-a (McKinney
1977); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 64(17-a) (McKinney Supp. 1979); N.Y.
VILLAGE LAW § 7-700 (McKinney 1973).
Historic Trails: N.Y. PARKS & REC. LAW § 3.09(7-a) (McKinney
Pamph. 1979).
Principal State Agency: N.Y. PARKS & REC. LAW §§ 11.01-.09, 19.01-
.13 (McKinney Pamph. 1979).
Review of Projects: N.Y. TRANSP. LAW § 14-a (McKinney 1975).
State Parks and Historic Sites: N.Y. PARKS & REC. LAW §§ 3.01-.21,
5.09-.09, 7.01-.11, 9.01-.09, 11.01-.09, 13.01-.27, 15.01-17.11, 19.01-
.13, 20.01-.03 (McKinney Pamph. 1979); N.Y. TRANSP. LAW
§ 14-a (McKinney 1975).
State Register of Historic Places: N.Y. PARKS & REC. LAW §§ 11.09(3),
19.03(3) (McKinney Pamph. 1979).
Taxation: N.Y. GEN. MUNIC. LAW. § 96-a (McKinney 1977); N.Y.
REAL PROP. TAX LAW §§ 400, 444 (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980);
id. § 421 (McKinney 1972); N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 11 16(d)(3)(A)-(C)
(McKinney 1975).
Tort Liability: N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 9-103 (McKinney 1978 &
Supp. 1979-1980).
North Carolina
Archaeology: N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 70-1 to -4 (1975); id. §§ 121-22 to
-27 (1974 & Supp. 1979); id. § 136-42.1 (Supp. 1979); id. §§ 143-
31.2, 143B-66 (1978).
Archives and Historical Commissions: N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 121-1 to
-21 (1974 & Supp. 1979); id. §§ 143B-92 to -110 (1978 & Supp.
1979).
Attorney-General Opinions: Op. Att'y Gen. (Apr. 7, 1964; Jan. 8,
1976). Municipal historic district designation not applicable to
state property.
Co-operative Use: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-23.1 (1978).
Crimes: See Archaeology.
Eminent Domain: N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-159(7), 160A-241(7)
(Supp. 1979).
52
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 2 [1980], Art. 12
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol11/iss2/12
NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
Environmental Quality: N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-1 to -10, -30 to -43
(1978); id. §§ ll3A-100 to -128, -151 to -159 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
Historic Districts: N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-395 to -399 (Supp. 1979).
Historic Landmarks: N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-399.1 to -399.13 (Supp.
1979).
Historic Trails: N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-72 to -94 (1978 & Supp.
1979).
Preservation Restrictions: N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 121-34 to -42 (Supp.
1979).
Principal State Agency: N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 121-1 to -13 (1974 &
Supp. 1979).
Restoration Contracts (Private Funds): N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-135.2
(1978).
Review of Projects: N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 121-12(a), 136-42.1 (1974 &
Supp. 1979).
State Parks and Historic Sites: N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113-29 to -44
(1978); id. §§ 121-4(7) (Supp. 1979); id. §§ 136-42.2 to -43.1 (1974
& Supp. 1979); id. §§ 143-260.6 to .9 (1978).
Taxation: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-278 (1979); id. § 160A-399.5(6)
(Supp. 1979).
Tort Liability: N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113-120.5-.6 (Supp. 1979).
North Dakota
Archaeology: N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 38-09-01.1-.2 (1972); id. §§ 55-03-
01 to -07 (1972 & Supp. 1979).
Archives and Historical Commissions: N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 11-11-52
to -53 (1976); id. §§ 11-32-01 to -03 (1976 & Supp. 1979); id. §§ 55-
01-01 to -11, -02-01 to -08 (1972 & Supp. 1979); id. §§ 55-09-01 to
-06 (1972).
Attorney-General Opinions: Op. Att'y Gen. (Dec. 12, 1963; Apr. 18,
1968). Permit not required for archaeological excavation on state-
owned land. 1963 opinion also discusses requirements for excava-
tion on state-owned land.
Crimes: N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-13 (Supp. 1979).
Environmental Quality: N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-22-09(9) (Supp. 1979).
Principal State Agency: N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 55-10-01 to -13 (1972 &
Supp. 1979).
Public Financial Assistance: N.D. CENT. CODE § 11-11-53 (1976).
Review of Projects: N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-08(2) (Supp. 1979).
State Parks and Historic Sites: N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 48-10-01 to -02
(1978 & Supp. 1979); id. §§ 55-04-01 to -03, -05-01 to -03, -06-01 to
-02 (1972); id. §§ 55-08-01 to -14, -10-01 to -13 (1972 & Supp.
1979).
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State Register of Historic Places: N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 55-10-03 to -06
(1972).
Taxation: See Archives and Historical Commissions.
Tort Liability: N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 53-08-01 to -06 (1974).
Ohio
Archives and Historical Commissions: OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 111.08 (Anderson 1978); id. §§ 149.01-.99 (Anderson 1978 &
Supp. 1979); id. §§ 307.23-.25, 345.17 (Anderson 1979).
Attorney-General Opinions: Op. Att'y Gen. 2516 (1953). County his-
torical society may use funds received under OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 307.23 to preserve historic house and may use the house to
display its collection of relics.
Civil Liability: See Crimes.
Crimes: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 155.05, .99 (Anderson 1978).
Environmental Quality: Olo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1501.16-.19,
1517.01-.99 (Anderson 1978).
Historic Landmarks: OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 713.02 (Anderson
1976).
Historic Trails: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1519.01-.99 (Anderson
1978).
Principal State Agency: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 149.01-.99 (Ander-
son 1978 & Supp. 1979), as amended, File 462, § 1, 1979 Ohio
Legis. Bull. 26.
Public Financial Assistance: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 307.23-.25
(Anderson 1979).
State Parks and Historic Sites: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 155.21-.27
(Anderson 1978); id. § 713.02 (Anderson 1976); id. §§ 1541.01-.10,
1743.06-.07 (Anderson 1978); id. § 5511.05 (Anderson Supp. 1979).
Taxation: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5709.18 (Anderson Supp. 1979).
Tort Liability: OHiO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1533.18-.181 (Anderson
1979).
Oklahoma
Archaeology: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 3309 (West 1972); id. tit. 74,
§§ 241, 1828 (West Supp. 1979-1980).
Archives and Historical Commissions: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 1-
349 (West 1969 & Supp. 1979-1980); id. tit. 74, § 72 (West 1965);
id. §§ 564-576 (West 1976 & Supp. 1979-1980).
Crimes: See Archaeology; Archives and Historical Commissions; State
Parks and Historic Sites.
Energy Conservation (Exemption): OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61,
§ 152(3)(b) (West Supp. 1979-1980).
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Environmental Quality: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, §§ 1451-1469 (West
Supp. 1979-1980).
Historic Trails: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, §§ 3451-3458 (West 1976 &
Supp 1979-1980).
Principal State Agency: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 1-23 (West 1969
& Supp. 1979-1980).
Public Financial Assistance: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 19 (West
Supp. 1979-1980).
State Parks and Historic Sites: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 1-214
(West 1965 & Supp. 1979-1980); id. tit. 74, § 7 (West 1965); id.
§§ 344.19-358.92 (West 1965 & Supp. 1979-1980).
Taxation: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 2404.1-.5 (West Supp. 1979-
1980).
Tort Liability: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 1301-315 (West 1973).
Oregon
Archaeology: OR. REV. STAT. §§ 273.705-.742 (1977).
Archives and Historic Commissions: OR. REV. STAT. §§ 358.110-.405,
.710-.770 (1977).
Cooperative Use: OR. REV. STAT. §§ 276.093-.097 (1977).
Environmental Quality: OR. REV. STAT. §§ 273.562-.597, 390.310-.368,
.410-.460, .805-.990 (1977).
Historic Trails: OR. REV. STAT. §§ 376.205-.220, .605 (1975); id.
§§ 390.950-.989 (1977).
Occupational Health and Safety (Exemption): OR. REV. STAT.
§ 654.170 (1977).
Preservation Restrictions: OR. REV. STAT. §§ 271.710-.750 (1977).
Principal State Agency: OR. REV. STAT. §§ 390.010-.290 (1977).
State Parks and Historic Sites: OR. CONST. art. IX, § 3; OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 226.110-.400 (1971); id. §§ 266.010-.590 (1975); id. §§ 276.001-
.108, 377.505-.545, 390.010-.290 (1977).
Taxation: OR. REV. STAT. §§ 308.740-.790, 358.475-.565 (1977).
Tort Liability: OR. REV. STAT. §§ 105.655-.680 (1977).
Pennsylvania
Archaeology: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1047.la-.lo (Purdon Supp.
1979-1980).
Archives and Historical Commissions: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 1928-
1931, 2355-2370, 5128-5130, 5555-5579 (Purdon 1956 & Supp.
1979-1980); id. tit. 47, § 5-505.3 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980); id. tit.
54, §§ 41-48 (Purdon 1964); id. tit. 71, §§ 716 to 718-3 (Purdon
1962 & Supp. 1979-1980); id. §§ 1042-1047.1 (Purdon 1962); id.
§ 104 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980); id. tit. 72, § 302(22).
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Crimes: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5509 (Purdon 1973); id. tit. 71,
§ 1047.1k (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980).
Environmental Quality: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 11941-11947 (Pur-
don Supp. 1979-1980); id. tit. 32, §§ 5001-5121.
Historic Districts: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 8001-8006 (Purdon 1972).
Historic Preservation: PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27; id. art. 8, § 15.
Historic Trails: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 64, §§ 801-805 (Purdon 1979-1980).
Principal State Agency: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1042-1047.1o (Pur-
don 1972 & Supp. 1979-1980).
Review of Projects: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 512(15) (Purdon Supp.
1979-1980); id. §§ 1047-li-j.
State Parks and Historic Sites: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1322(F) (Pur-
don Supp. 1979-1980); id. tit. 16, §§ 1995, 1999; id. tit. 24, § 7-
707(10); id. tit. 32, §§ 821-1193 (Purdon 1967); id. tit. 44, § 35; id.
tit. 53, §§ 37403(61), 46202(48), 56562, 65760; id. tit. 71, § 512(15)
(Purdon Supp. 1979-1980); id. tit. 71, § 770.1 (Purdon 1962); id.
§§ 1051-1060.233 (Purdon 1962 & Supp. 1979-1980); id. tit. 72,
§§ 3946.1-.22 (Purdon 1968).
State Register of Historic Places: PA. STAT. ANN. § 1047. 1g (Purdon
Supp. 1979-1980).
Taxation: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3402-303(B)(7) (Purdon 1964).
Tort Liability: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 477-1 to -8 (Purdon Supp.
1979-1980).
Puerto Rico
Archives and Historical Commissions: P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 18,
§§ 1191-1203c (1974 & Supp. 1978).
Environmental Quality: P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1121-1142 (Supp.
1978).
Historic Districts: P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 17, § 214a (1972); id. tit. 18,
§ 1198(8) (Supp. 1978); id. tit. 23, §§ 161-166 (1964 & Supp. 1978).
Historic Landmarks: P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 23, § 167 (Supp. 1978).
Historic Preservation: P.R. CONST. art. VI, § 19.
Principal State Agency: P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1191-1203c (1974 &
Supp. 1978).
State Parks and Historic Sites: P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1-55 (1972 &
Supp. 1978).
State Register of Historic Places: P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 23, § 167 (Supp.
1978).
Taxation: P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 13, § 3022(26) (1978).
Rhode Island
Archaeology: R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-45.1-1 to -13 (1977 & Supp. 1979).
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Archives and Historical Commissions: R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 29-2-1 to -6
(1968 & Supp. 1979).
Historic Districts: R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 45-24.1-1 to -15 (1970 & Supp.
1979). Newport, Warwick, Providence, Cranston, Smithfield,
North Smithfield, East Greenwich, Coventry, and Woonsocket are
authorized specifically to regulate historic properties.
Historic Trails: R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 32-5-1 to -2 (Supp. 1979).
Preservation Restrictions: R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-39-1 to -5 (Supp.
1979).
Principal State Agency: R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-45-1 to -9 (1977 &
Supp. 1979).
Review of Projects: R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-45-5(b), -45.1-7 (1977).
State Parks and Historic Sites: R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 30-28-1 to -9 (1968);
id. §§ 32-1-2 to -18, -2-1 to -14 (1968 & Supp. 1979); id. §§ 32-3-1
to -12, -4-1 to -15 (1968).
State Register of Historic Places: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-45-5(b) (1977).
Tort Liability: R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 32-6-1 to -7 (Supp. 1979).
South Carolina
Archaeology: S.C. CODE §§ 54-7-210 to -280 (Supp. 1979); id. § 60-13-
210 (1976).
Archives and Historical Commissions: S.C. CODE §§ 51-13-510 to
-540, -610 to -620 (1976); id. §§ -910 to -960, -19-10 to -20 (Supp.
1979); id. §§ 60-11-10 to -80, -13-10 to -50 (1976). Many local
commissions are established by session law.
Historical commissions (by county):
Aiken: No. 339, 1959 S.C. Acts 639.
Allendale: No. 448, 1967 S.C. Acts 644.
Beaufort: No. 1730, 1972 S.C. Acts 3388.
Calhoun: No. 757, 1952 S.C. Acts 1911, as amended, No. 124,
1971 S.C. Acts 99, as amended, No. 497, 1976 S.C. Acts 1496.
Camden (in Kershaw County): No. 308, 1969 S.C. Acts 373, as
amended, No. 549, 1971 S.C. Acts 1039.
Cherokee: No. 606, 1973 S.C. Acts. 1098, as amended, No. 996,
1974 S.C. Acts 2171.
Chester: No. 1049, 1958 S.C. Acts 2217, as amended, No. 1238,
1966 S.C. Acts 3096, as amended, No. 735, 1978 S.C. Acts
2386.
Darlington: No. 570, 1965 S.C. Acts 1180, as amended, No. 248,
1967 S.C. Acts 341, as amended, No. 319, 1977 S.C. Acts 955.
Fairfield: No. 1079, 1958 S.C. Acts 2322.
Florence City-County: No. 426, 1973 S.C. Acts 762.
Georgetown: No. 23, 1967 S.C. Acts 24, as amended, No. 62, 1973
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S.C. Acts 66, as amended, No. 332, 1977 S.C. Acts 967, as
amended, No. 761, 1978 S.C. Acts 2435.
Lancaster: No. 123, 1953 S.C. Acts 148, as amended, No. 239, 1963
S.C. Acts 271.
Lee: No. 237, 1949 S.C. Acts 381.
McCormick: No. 92, 1971 S.C. Acts 74, as amended, No. 201, 1975
S.C. Acts 239, as amended, No. 726, 1976 S.C. Acts 2176.
Newberry: No. 678, 1965 S.C. Acts 1630.
Orangeburg: No. 315, 1967 S.C. Acts 434.
Union: No. 840, 1966 S.C. Acts 2155, as amended, No. 939, 1970
S.C. Acts 2037.
York: No. 540, 1959 S.C. Acts 1367.
Historical Commissions (by site):
Cokesbury: No. 487, 1969 S.C. Acts 848, as amended, No. 133,
1971 S.C. Acts 106, No. 595, 1971 S.C. Acts 1100.
Long Bluff: No. 1794, 1972 S.C. Acts 3563.
Star Fort and Old Ninety Six: No. 556, 1963 S.C. Acts 1090, as
amended, No. 1547, 1968 S.C. Acts 3588, as amended, No.
840, 1976 S.C. Acts 2412.
Williamsburg: No. 508, 1969 S.C. Acts 870.
Museum Commissions (by county):
Lexington: No. 1353, 1968 S.C. Acts 3144.
Pickens: No. 35, 1969 S.C. Acts 39.
Environmental Quality: S.C. CODE §§ 51-5-10 to -170 (1976); id. §§ -7-
10 to -140 (Supp. 1979).
Historic Districts: S.C. CODE §§ 5-23-310 to -340, 6-11-650 (1976).
Historic Preservation Commissions (by county):
Abbeville: No. 902, 1964 S.C. Acts 2123, as amended, No. 881,
1968 S.C. Acts 2243.
Barnwell: No. 367, 1965 S.C. Acts 600, as amended, No. 9, 1973
S.C. Acts 6.
Berkeley: No. 141, 1967 S.C. Acts 195.
Chesterfield: No. 304, 1971 S.C. Acts 402, No. 919, 1971 S.C. Acts
2050.
Clarendon: No. 190, 1967 S.C. Acts 256.
Dillon: No. 1027, 1966 S.C. Acts 2625.
Greenville: No. 833, 1970 S.C. Acts 1901.
Horry: No. 130, 1965 S.C. Acts 173, as amended, No. 1479, 1972
S.C. Acts 2717.
Laurens: No. 879, 1966 S.C. Acts 2210, as amended, No. 888, 1968
S.C. Acts 2253, as amended, No. 995, 1970 S.C. Acts 2281.
Marlboro: No. 185, 1967 S.C. Acts 243.
Spartanburg: No. 1220, 1968 S.C. Acts 2795, as amended, No. 13,
1973 S.C. Acts 9, No. 334, 1973 S.C. Acts. 411.
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Principal State Agency: S.C. CODE §§ 60-11-10 to -80 (1976).
State Parks and Historic Sites: S.C. CODE §§ 51-1-10 to -90, -3-10 to
-160 (1976 & Supp. 1979); id. § 4-17-20 (1976).
Lancaster County: No. 754, 1940 S.C. Acts 1612.
Taxation: S.C. CODE § 12-21-2420(9) (1976).
Tort Liability: S.C. CODE §§ 27-3-10 to -70 (1976).
South Dakota
Archaeology: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 1-20-17 to -37 (1974 &
Supp. 1979); id. § 31-5-19 (1976).
Archives and Historical Commissions: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§§ 1-18-1.1 to -32.1, -18B-1 to -13 (1974 & Supp. 1979); id. §§ 1-
18C-1 to -13 (Supp. 1979); id. §§ 1-45-18 to -23.1 (1974 & Supp.
1979).
Building Codes: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-19B-54 (1974).
Crimes: See Archaeology.
Environmental Quality: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 34A-9-1 to -13
(1977).
Historic Districts: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 1-19B-33 to -50
(1974).
Historic Landmarks: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 1-19B-13 to -31
(1974).
Public Financial Assistance: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ l- 19A- 13.1
to -13.5 (Supp. 1979).
Preservation Restrictions: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-19B-16
(1974).
Principal State Agency: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 1-19A-1 to -19
(1974 & Supp. 1979).
State Parks and Historic Sites: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 1-19-1 to
-8 (1974); id. §§ 7-26-1 to -7, 9-38-1 to -104 (1967 & Supp. 1979);
id. § 31-5-8.1 (Supp. 1979); id. §§ 41-17-1 to -20 (1977 & Supp.
1979); id. §§ 41-18-1 to -25 (1977).
State Register of Historic Places: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § I-19A-
5 (1974).
Review of Projects: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 31-5-19 (1976).
Taxation: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-19A-20 (Supp. 1979); id. § 1-
19B-25 (1974); id. §§ 9-3-22 to -27 (Supp. 1979).
Tort Liability: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-5 (1979).
Tennessee
Archaeology: TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 11-6-101 to -115 (1980).
Archives and Historical Commissions: TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-1 1-101
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to -110, -12-101 to -111 (1979); id. § 5-901(21) (Supp. 1979); id.
§ 5-1801 (1971); id. §§ 10-1-101 to -204 (1980); id. § 18-113 (1955).
Crimes: TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4535 (1975).
Environmental Quality: TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 11-13-101 to -117, -14-
101 to -203 (1980).
Historic Districts: TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-7-401 (1980).
Historic Trails: TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 11-11-101 to -120 (1980).
Preservation Restrictions: TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 11-15-101 to -108
(1980).
Principal State Agency: TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-11-101 to -208 (1979).
State Parks and Historic Sites: TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-906 to -908
(1971 & Supp. 1979); id. §§ 11-3-101 to -116, -21-101 to -109
(1980); id. §§ 54-580 to -583, -2501 to -2516 (Supp. 1979).
State Register of Historic Places: TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-11-201 to
-208 (1979).
Taxation: TENN. CODE ANN. § 11-15-105 (1980); id. §§ 67-519 to -521
(1976 & Supp. 1979).
Tort Liability: TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 11-10-101 to -103 (1980); id. §§
51-801 to -805 (1977).
Texas
Archaeology: TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 191.001-.174 (Vernon
1978); id. §§ 201.001-.043 (Vernon Supp. 1979); TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 6145-6 (Vernon 1970).
Archives and Historical Commissions: TEX. NAT. RES. CODE
§§ 181.011-.103 (Vernon 1978 & Supp. 1979); id. §§ 182.001-.045
(Vernon 1978); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 250-260 (Vernon
1973); id. art. 678m, §§ 15-16 (Vernon 1964); id. arts. 5434, 5439,
5441, 5443, 5445-5446(a) (Vernon 1958 & Supp. 1979); id. art. 6145
(Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1979); id. art. 6145.1 (Vernon Supp. 1979).
Attorney-General Opinions: Op. Att'y Gen. M-826 (1971). Require-
ment of six-months notice by county to Texas State Historical Sur-
vey Committee contained in 1971 legislation is not comprehended
with the Antiquities Code. H-620 (1975). Discusses sites of "his-
toric interest" concluding that the term "historic interest" is not
impermissibly vague. H-866 (1976). Facade easements are valid
in Texas and may be granted to the Texas Historical Commission.
H-1100 (1977). Texas Historical Commission may promulgate
rule providing for special election to fill vacancy in office of chair-
man, and may make it applicable to term of present chairman; in
absence of such rule, vice chairman should serve as acting chair-
man.
Crimes: TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 191.171 (Vernon 1978).
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Environmental Quality: TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 33.001-.176
(Vernon 1978).
Historic Districts: TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1011a (Vernon
1963); id. art. 6145-4 (Vernon 1970).
Public Financial Assistance: TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1066d
(Vernon Supp. 1979).
Principal State Agency: TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6145 (Vernon
Supp. 1979).
Review of Projects: TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6145 § 12(2)
(Vernon Supp. 1979).
State Parks and Historic Sites: TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 39; TEX. NAT.
RES. CODE ANN. §§ 13.001-.313 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1979);
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 678M, § 16A (Vernon 1964); id.
art. 2372r-l (Vernon 1971 & Supp. 1979); id. art. 5421q (Vernon
Supp. 1979); id. arts. 6079e-6079f, 6080-6081; 6081t, 6144g, 6145-2,
-5 (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1979).
State Register of Historic Places: TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6145,
§ 12(1) (Vernon Supp. 1979).
Taxation: TEX. PROP. TAX CODE §§ 11. 18(c)(1)(D), .24 (Vernon
Pamph. 1979).
Tort Liability: TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. lb (Vernon 1969).
Trust Territory of the Pacoic Islands
Archaeology: See Historic Districts; State Parks and Historic Sites.
Archives and Historical Commissions: See State Parks and Historic
Sites.
Historic Districts: TRUST TERR. CODE tit. 51, §§ 3(o), 5(d) (Supp.
1973).
Principal State Agency: TRUST TERR. CODE tit. 67, §§ 251-256 (1970).
State Parks and Historic Sites: TRUST TERR. CODE tit. 67, §§ 251-256
(1970).
Utah
Archaeology: UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-18-24 to -28 (1978).
Archives and Historical Commissions: UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-2-59 to
-91 (1978 & Supp. 1979); id. § 63-11-56 (1978).
Crimes: UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-18-29 to -31 (1978).
Environmental Quality: UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-28-1 to -10 (1978 &
Supp. 1979).
Historic Districts: UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 11-18-1 to -6 (1973); id. §§ 63-
9-30 to -42 (1978).
Preservation Restrictions: UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-18a-1 to -6 (1978).
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Principal State Agency: UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-18-2.1 to -4, -33 (1978
& Supp. 1979).
Public Financial Assistance: UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-18-38 (1978).
Review of Projects: UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-18-37 (1978).
State Parks and Historic Sites: UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-11-1 to -63
(1978 & Supp. 1979); id. §§ 63-18-2.1 to -38 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
State Register of Historic Places: UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-18-32, -36
(1978).
Taxation: UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-18a-6 (1978).
Vermont
Archaeology: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 761-767, 781-782 (1978).
Archives and Historical Commissions: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 196
(1973); id. tit. 22, §§ 281-285, 451-457 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
Crimes: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2023 (Supp. 1979); id. tit. 22, § 791
(1978); id. §§ 2601-2609 (Supp. 1979).
Environmental Quality: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 421-425, 6001-6091
(1973 & Supp. 1979).
Historic Districts: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4407(6) (1975); id. tit. 29,
§§ 181-185 (Supp. 1979).
Preservation Restrictions: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 723(b) (1978).
Principal State Agency: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 721-723, 741-743
(1978 & Supp. 1979).
Public Financial Assistance: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 723(b)(4) (1978).
Review of Projects: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1624a (1968); id. tit. 22,
§§ 743, 767 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
State Parks and Historic Sites: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1624a (1968);
id. tit. 29, §§ 154-155 (1970).
State Register of Historic Places: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 723(a)(3)
(Supp. 1979); id. § 742(a)(1), (b)(1) (1978).
Tort Liability: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5212 (1973); id. tit. 13,
§§ 3769-3770 (1974).
Virgin Islands
Archives and Historical Commissions: V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 3, §§ 16-21
(Supp. 1979).
Crimes: V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 32, § 94 (1976).
Historic Districts: V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §§ 280-288 (1976); id. tit. 32,
§§ 91-94.
Principal State Agency: V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 281 (1976).
State Parks and Historic Sites: V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 32, §§ 1-62 (1976 &
Supp. 1979).
State Register of Historic Places: V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 282 (1976).
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Taxation: V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 33, §§ 2355-2355f (Supp. 1979).
Virginia
Archaeology: VA. CODE §§ 10-146 to -150.16 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
Archives and Historical Commissions: VA. CODE §§ 10-135, -144,
-145.5 (1978); id. §§ 15.1-18.1:1, -25, -281 (1973 & Supp. 1979).
Crimes: VA. CODE §§ 10-145.8, .10, .13 to .16 (1978 & Supp. 1979); id.
§ 18.2-107 (Supp. 1979); id. §§ 18.2-137 to -138 (1975).
Environmental Quality: VA. CODE §§ 10-151 to -186 (1978 & Supp.
1979).
Historic Districts: VA. CODE §§ 10-138.2, -141 (1978); id. §§ 15.1-
489(5), -503.2 (Supp. 1979).
Historic Trails: VA. CODE § 10-21.3:1 (1978); id. § 15.1-274.1 (Supp.
1979).
State Parks and Historic Sites: VA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-2; VA. CODE
§§ 9-84.1 to .10, -96 to -99, 10-18 to -21.3:1, -176 (1978); id.
§§ 33.1-62 to -66, -223 (1976).
Preservation Restrictions: VA. CODE §§ 10-138(e), -142 (1978).
Principal State Agency: VA. CODE §§ 10-135 to -145.10 (1978 & Supp.
1979).
State Register of Historic Places: VA. CODE § 10-138(b) (1978).
Taxation: VA. CONST. art. X, §§ 6(a)(6),(h); VA. CODE §§ 10-139 to
-140, -145.10, -155 (1978); id. §§ 58-12(7)-(8), (12)-(13), (15), -12.4,
.12, .29, .32, .37, .77, .90-.92, -760.2 to .3, -769.4 to .16 (1974 &
Supp. 1979).
Tort Liability: VA. CODE § 10-150.18 (Supp. 1979); id. § 29-130.2
(1979).
Washington
Archaeology: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 27.44.010-.020 (1970 &
Supp. 1980); id. §§ 27.53.010-.900 (Supp. 1980).
Archives and Historical Commissions: WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 9.68.015, .100 (1977); id. §§ 27.28.010-.040 (1970 & Supp. 1980);
id. §§ 27.32.010-.030 (Supp. 1980); id. §§ 27.36.010-.070, 48.010-
.030 (1970 & Supp. 1980); id. §§ 40.14.010-.180 (1972 & Supp.
1980).
Crimes: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68.015 (1977); id. § 27.44.010
(1970); id. § 27.53.090 (Supp. 1980); id. §§ 40.16.010-.030 (1972).
Environmental Quality: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 43.51.900-.930
(1970); id. §§ 43.97.010-.050, 47.39.010-.910 (1970 & Supp. 1980);
id. §§ 79.70.010-.900 (Supp. 1980).
Historic Trails: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 67.32.010-.140 (Supp.
1980).
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Preservation Restri,-: ... "'".SH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 84.34.010-.921
(Supp. 1980).
Principal State Agency: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 43.5 1A.0 10-. 140
(Supp. 1980).
State Parks and Historic Sites: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 43.51.010-
.375 (1970 & Supp. 1980); id. § 47.12.250 (1970).
Taxation: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 35.21.755, 84.34.010-.921,
.36.060 (Supp. 1980).
Tort Liability: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.24.200-.210 (Supp. 1980).
West Virginia
Archaeology: W. VA. CODE §§ 20-7A-1 to -6 (1978); id. § 29-1-7
(1980).
Archives and Historical Commissions: W. VA. CODE §§ 5-8-1 to -20,
5A-4A-1 to -3 (1979); id. §§ 8-26A-l to -6 (1976,& Supp. 1979); id.
§ 57-1-7c (Supp. 1979).
Attorney General Opinions: Op. ATT'Y GEN. (June 24, 1977).
Crimes: W. VA. CODE § 20-7A-2 (1978); id. § 29-1-7 (1980).
Environmental Quality: W. VA. CODE § 20-5B-1 to -17 (1978).
Historic Districts: W. VA. CODE §§ 8-26A-3(7)-(8), -5 (1976).
Historic Landmarks: W. VA. CODE § 8-26A-2 (1976).
State Parks and Historic Sites: W. VA. CODE §§ 5A-4A-1 to -3 (1979 &
Supp. 1979); id. §§ 8-26A-1 to -6 (1976 & Supp. 1979); id. § 8-32-1
(Supp. 1979); id. §§ 20-4-1 to -13 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
Preservation Restrictions: W. VA. CODE § 8-26A-4 (1976).
Principal State Agency: W. VA. CODE §§ 29-1-1 to -13 (Supp. 1979).
State Register of Historic Places: W. VA. CODE § 8-26A-3(2) (1976).
Taxation: W. VA. CODE § 8-26A-5 (1976).
Tort Liability: W. VA. CODE §§ 19-25-1 to -6 (1977); id. § 20-7A-6
(1978).
Wisconsin
Archaeology: Wis. STAT. ANN. § 27.012 (West 1973 & Supp. 1979).
Archives and Historical Commissions: Wis. STAT. ANN. § 16.61 (West
1972 & Supp. 1979); id. § 19.21(5) (West 1972); id. § 19.23 (West
1972 & Supp. 1979); id. §§ 44.01-.21 (West 1979 & Supp. 1979); id.
§ 59.07(31)-(32) (West 1957 & Supp. 1979); id. § 86.19(4) (West
Supp. 1979).
Attorney General Opinions: 59 Op. Att'y Gen. 18 (Jan. 16, 1970).
Crimes: WIs. STAT. ANN. § 27.012(7) (West 1973 & Supp. 1979).
Environmental Quality: WIs. STAT. ANN. § 30.26 (West 1973); id.
§§ 30.27, 83.42 (West Supp. 1979).
Historic Trails: WIs. STAT. ANN. § 83.42 (West Supp. 1979).
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Preservation Restrictions: WIs. STAT. ANN. § 61.34(3)-(3m) (West
Supp. 1979); id. § 62.22 (West 1957 & Supp. 1979).
Principal State Agency: WIs. STAT. ANN. § 15.705 (West Supp. 1979);
id. § 44.22 (West 1979).
Review of Projects: WIs. STAT. ANN. § 15.705(1) (West Supp. 1979);
id. § 44.22(5), (7)-(8) (West 1979).
State Parks and Historic Sites: WIs. STAT. ANN. § 16.855(18) (West
Supp. 1979); id. § 23.30 (West 1973); id. §§ 27.01-.99 (West 1973 &
Supp. 1979); id. §§ 60.18(15), 61.34(3)-(3m) (West Supp. 1979); id.
§ 176.05(21)(h)-(j) (West 1974 & Supp. 1979).
State Register of Historic Places: WIs. STAT. ANN. § 15.705(2) (West
Supp. 1979); id. § 44.22(6)(b) (West 1979).
Taxation: WIs. STAT. ANN. § 70.11(4) (West 1969); id. § 70.11(20)
(West Supp. 1979).
Tort Liability: WIs. STAT. ANN. § 29.68 (West 1973 & Supp. 1979).
Wyoming
Archaeology: WYo. STAT. §§ 35-11-401(d)(iv), 36-1-114 to -116 (1977).
Archives and Historical Commissions: WYO. STAT. §§ 9-3-901 to -988
(1977 & Supp. 1979); id. §§ 17-7-101 to -116, 18-10-101 to -219
(1977).
Crimes: WYo. STAT. §§ 9-3-988, 36-1-116 (1977).
Principal State Agency: WYo. STAT. §§ 36-4-101 to -121 (1977 & Supp.
1979).
State Parks and Historic Sites: WYo. STAT. §§ 9-8-101 to -130, -140,
18-9-101 to -202 (1977); id. §§ 36-4-101 to -121, -8-101 to -801
(1977 & Supp. 1979).
Tort Liability: WYo. STAT. §§ 34-19-101 to -106 (1977).
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